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ABSTRACT
In today’s computer security climate, attacks against computers are becom-
ing increasingly sophisticated and cheaper to execute. In this thesis, we
present the results of a study conducted on the University of Illinois campus
to determine the effectiveness of dropping 297 “infected” USB flash drives in
a public place as an attack vector. A self-report survey given to 71 individ-
uals highlights some of the psychological processes that motivate people to
plug in the flash drives. We find that this type of attack is generally effective
and relatively insensitive to its precise environmental configuration. Gener-
ally, participants expressed desire to return the flash drives to their owners,
although our data shows that they also explored the contents of the flash
drives on occasion.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
While much recent attention has been directed towards technical exploits,
such as Heartbleed [1], VENOM [2] or the Shellshock vulnerability [3], we
direct our attention in this thesis to another relevant threat: social engineer-
ing. Social engineering attacks have significant financial cost [4], outweighing
stolen devices, malware, and botnets [5]. They are also common; 42% of
surveyed companies in Ponemon’s 2013 Cost of Cyber Crime Study have ex-
perienced a social engineering attack during the four-week benchmark period
[5].
In this thesis, we investigate a classic anecdote, in which an attacker infects
a set of USB flash drives with malware and drops them into the parking lot
of an organization that they wish to compromise. Legitimate users in the
organization see the flash drives, pick them up, and insert them into their
computers, allowing the attacker an opportunity to run malware on the flash
drives on the computers and compromise the organization. Recent attacks,
such as Stuxnet [6] and BadUSB [7] underscore the risk that unknown flash
drives present to organizations.
We seek to answer three main questions in this work:
1. Is this attack viable in the real world? In other words, do people
actually pick up the USB sticks and place them in their computers? If
so, how often does this happen?
2. Why do people pick up the flash drives?
3. Does this behavior change based on the appearance of the drive, where
it is placed, or when it is placed?
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We begin by hypothesizing that the attack is effective and primarily ex-
ploits either altruism (a desire to return the flash drive to its owner) or
self-interest (a desire to profit from the contents of the flash drive). We ex-
pect that appropriately configured flash drives can increase compromise rates
by playing on these emotions, and that the location and time of day in which
the flash drives are dropped will significantly impact the rate of compromise.
We hypothesize that these motivations are essentially universal; victims will
not differ appreciably in their risk attitudes from the general population.
To test these hypotheses, we designed an experiment in which we dropped
297 flash drives on the campus of a large Midwestern university over the
course of two days. The drives were dropped in 30 different locations on
campus corresponding to five major types of locations: academic rooms,
common rooms, hallways, parking lots, and outdoor areas. The flash drives
had varying appearances to appeal to both altruism (drives with keys and
contact information return labels attached) and self-interest in the form of
curiosity (drives marked “Confidential” and “Final Exam Solutions”). The
drives contained plausible folder structures and HTML files that notified our
servers (via an img tag) whenever the file was opened in an internet-connected
web browser. We collected data which includes information about the flash
drives, file open times, and opened files; this data provides insight into which
flash drive configurations are most effective. To explore the risk attitudes
and thought processes of people who picked up the flash drives, we asked
participants who clicked on these HTML files to complete an optional survey.
This survey included demographic questions, questions about the flash drives,
as well as the Security Behavior Intentions Scale [8] and Domain-Specific
Risk-Taking Scale [9]. Seventy-one participants completed this survey.
We find that this attack is effective, even in the presence of alerts shared
on social media. While the configuration of the flash drive does not appear to
impact compromise rates, the location in which the drive is placed strongly
impacts compromise rate. Our file open data, combined with responses to the
survey, indicate that most participants are motivated by a desire to return
the drive, but we do see that some participants investigate its contents.
We organize the rest of this thesis as follows: in Section 1.2, we describe
our research questions and hypotheses. In Chapter 2, we discuss relevant
work. In Section 3.1 we describe the research methodology for the USB
experiment, and in Section 3.2 we discuss ethical considerations. The results
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from the experiment are presented in Section 3.3, while the methodology
of and responses to our self-report survey are presented in Section 4.1 and
Section 4.2. We discuss the public’s reaction to the experiment in Section 4.3.
We discuss the implications of our findings in Section 5.1 and contextualize
our work by describing methodological limitations in Section 5.2 and avenues
for future work in Section 5.3. Finally, we conclude this thesis in Section 5.4.
1.2 Research Questions
We choose to view participants in this experiment through the lens of ra-
tional choice theory. This theory states that individuals make decisions by
“balancing the costs and benefits of [their] options” [10]. This theory has
been applied in other information security contexts as well [10].
We choose to view participants in this experiment through the lens of
rational choice theory.
In the case of picking up a foreign flash drive and plugging it into a com-
puter, we hypothesize that most people consider the activity low-risk and are
thus more likely to do it.
Therefore, we seek answers to the following research questions:
1. Is this attack viable in the real world? In other words, do people
actually pick up the USB sticks and place them in their computers? If
so, how often does this happen?
2. Why do people pick up the flash drives?
3. Does this behavior change based on the appearance of the drive, where
it is placed, or when it is placed?
We posit the following hypotheses about this data:
• Hypothesis 1: Participants will place the flash drives in computers and
click on the relevant files.
• Hypothesis 2a: Participants who pick up flash drives will primarily
report doing so for two reasons: to return the flash drive to its owner
(an altruistic reason) and out of curiosity/to benefit from the contents
of the drive (a self-interested reason).
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• Hypothesis 2b: Psychological scales that measure risk attitude will cor-
relate with cybercrime victimization in the general population because
participants who believe that picking up the flash drive is too risky will
not do so and will thus not be victimized.
• Hypothesis 2c: Participants who picked up the flash drives will have
greater risk attitude scores than the general population.
• Hypothesis 3a: The time of day at which drives are placed will not
significantly impact success rates because people will quickly pick up
the drives once they are dropped.
• Hypothesis 3b: The type of location at which drives are dropped will
significantly impact success rates because different location types will
attract different demographics and will have different drive visibilities.
• Hypothesis 3c: Altruistically configured drives will have a greater suc-
cess rate than drives designed to motivate self-interest because partic-
ipants will be more motivated to plug in the drive if they believe they
can help someone by doing so.
• Hypothesis 3d: Both altruistically configured and self-interest-configured
drives will have greater success rates than the control group.
1.3 Contributions
In this section, we describe how this study expands on existing work.
We provide a larger-scale experiment than existing studies [11,
12, 13, 14], allowing us to provide more data points about the
attack. Each of the referenced studies used 60 or fewer drives, preventing
the authors from being able to test different experimental parameters without
significantly reducing the experiment’s statistical power. Our study involves
297 USB flash drives, nearly five times the quantity used in any of these
studies. As such, our experiment, which varies the appearance of the flash
drive, the time of day it is dropped, and the location at which is dropped,
benefits from the additional drives in the data set. We find that 135/297
(45.45%) of our flash drives were opened after being dropped. Flash drive
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appearance and drop time of day did not appear to significantly influence
open rates, provided that the drive did not contain any contact information
on an external return label. Location appeared to influence open rates.
We provide additional insight into users’ behaviors about these
drives by providing the results of a survey that includes the
DOSPERT and SeBIS scales as well as open response questions.
Participants who picked up a flash drive, inserted it into a computer, and
clicked on a file were offered the opportunity to complete a survey. In this sur-
vey, they were asked questions about their attitudes towards risk taking (the
DOSPERT scale) and computer security behavior (the SeBIS scale), along
with questions about why they picked up the flash drive and demographic
questions. We find that many participants express that they wished to re-
turn the flash drive to its original owner. In addition, participants expressed
less willingness to try risky activities in all domains except recreational risk
and seemed to guard their computers more closely, trust links more, and use
weaker passwords. Participants were generally similar to a university popu-
lation. Their web browser usage was representative of the internet at large,
although they used disproportionately more Macs.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Taxonomy
To highlight the structure of related work in this paper, we present the fol-
lowing explicit taxonomy:
1. Social Engineering
(a) Similar USB Flash Drive Studies
i. Peer-Reviewed Studies
ii. Anecdotal Evidence
2. Human Decision-Making
(a) Risk Attitude Scales
i. Developed Scales
(b) Correlates of Cybercrime Victimization
i. Only Surveys
ii. Other Risk Factors
(c) Perceived Risk
i. Correlated Factors
ii. Evidence of Attitudes
(d) Online Behaviors
i. Correlated Factors
We discuss recent social engineering work to illustrate recent developments
in the field; similar USB flash drive studies show the current knowledge on
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this topic and provide useful guidance for the design of our study. This
review corresponds to our first and third research questions.
As one of the major contributions of this paper is insight into the thought
process of participants in the experiment, we heavily refer to work in human
decision making. We present scales that have been developed to measure
perceived risk in other contexts, including the two scales that we use in this
work. We also highlight work that indicates the default risk perception state
of various populations. Finally, we present a selection of studies that at-
tempt to determine correlates of actions related to risk. Broadly speaking,
these studies fall into three categories: risk attitudes, online behaviors, and
cybercrime victimization. Risk attitude correlate studies attempt to corre-
late factors with the perception that an act is risky, while online behavior
studies attempt to correlate factors with the likelihood that a participant
would either perform a beneficial security behavior (e.g., use a strong pass-
word) or a harmful one (e.g., click on a link in an e-mail from an unknown
sender). Cybercrime victimization studies attempt to correlate factors with
the knowledge that a participant has fallen victim to some form of cyber-
crime in the past. Prior work of this form influenced the survey instruments
used in this study.
2.2 Social Engineering
In this section, we discuss recent work in social engineering and previous
applications of USB-based attacks in order to highlight current knowledge
about our first and third research questions.
Modern work in social engineering often emphasizes the low cost of feasible
attacks; phishing attacks can be made more effective using social data [15]
and automation [16]. It is now possible to attack Bluetooth devices at low
cost and without arousing suspicion, even in secure areas [17]. Participants
will attempt to access cell phones they find on the ground [18]. Users can
even be financially incentivized to run unknown executables at low cost [19].
Some recent work has also been designed to taxonomize and defeat these
types of attacks [20]. Our work represents another type of social engineering
attack that can be performed at low cost.
Jagatic et al. [15] describe the process of “social phishing,” or using pub-
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licly available social networking data to improve the effectiveness of a phish-
ing attack. They phished a group of Indiana University students in April
2005; 16% of the control group fell for the generic phishing attack, while
72% of the social group fell for the social phishing attack. In both attacks,
recipients were sent a spoofed email with a link to an external site that
asked for their university login credentials from a sender with an indiana.edu
email address; in the social case, the email was sent from one of the target’s
connections.
The attack was effective during a short time frame; “70% of successful
authentications” occurred within the first 12 hours of the attack. “Some
users visited the site (and disclosed their passwords) over 80 times.” Women
appeared to be more vulnerable to the attack, and “the attack was more
successful if the spoofed message appeared to be sent by a person of the
opposite gender.” Class standing did not significantly impact compromise
rate, although major did in the case of the social attack.
The authors also attempted to perform another attack in which the phish-
ing email seemed to originate from a group conversation of friends. However,
a coding error caused the email to be sent to the author of the email; this
attack still had a 53% success rate.
In forums that were designed to let participants discuss the experiment,
subjects expressed anger, denial, and misunderstanding about email and so-
cial networking technologies.
Huber et al. [16] explore the possibility of automating a social engineering
attack on an organization using a social networking site; automating the
attack would reduce cost.
They propose a model for a bot that has 5 different phases: plan, map &
bond, execute, recruit & cloak, and evolve/regress. In the planning phase, the
attacker provides the bot with “initial parameters” that specify the attack.
The bot then connects to appropriate people and chats with them using chat
logic that was defined in the chat stage (“map & bond”). Eventually, the
bot carries out the attack (“execute”) and either deletes the attack account
or “tries to recruit the attacked user and her/his circle of friends for future
attacks” (“recruit & cloak”). Finally, the bot adapts its behavior based on
the effectiveness of the attack (evolve/regress).
The authors mined data from “the five succeeding Sweden-based multina-
tional corporations that are big enough to presumably have a large number of
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employees registered on Facebook.” This process took 4 hours from start to
finish and found 8.4 viable attack targets (single males who belonged to the
organization’s closed network and who were accessible) on average. “Except
from the CAPTCHA that needed to be solved manually in order to create
an account for the ASE bot, no technical measures of Facebook banned or
blocked the ASE bot.”
The authors also recruited 20 university students to perform a Turing test
to see if their chat bot was effective enough to be considered a person. The
bot was based on annotated Alice AIML (AAA) files. The subjects believed
the chatbot was a bot with probability 85.1%, while other subjects believed
the control human was human, with a 3.27% chance of being an AI.
Carettoni et al. [17] discuss their experiences with a prototype “covert
attack and scanning device” for Bluetooth called the BlueBag. This bag,
containing a MiniITX PC running Gentoo and related peripherals, costs
approximately $750 to build. The purpose of the bag was to investigate how
inconspicuous attack devices could be built for Bluetooth.
In approximately 23 hours over 7 high-traffic areas in Milan, the authors
found 1405 discoverable devices. Of these devices, 1312 were smart phones;
of these, 313 devices could be scanned for the presence of the OBEX Push
service. The authors blame the discrepancy in these two numbers on range;
they suspect that most devices have this service active. The authors sug-
gested that the average “visibility time” for these devices ranged from 10.1
to 23.1 seconds in different locations.
The authors also attempted to send a file to all devices with active OBEX
Push support; “an astounding 7.5 percent of device owners carelessly ac-
cepted unknown file transfers from unknown sources and were thus highly
vulnerable to social engineering attacks.”
The authors also built a sample Java Bluetooth worm and developed a
simulation that would estimate the propagation of the worm using parameters
derived from their real world experiences. They found that a single infected
device could infect an entire food court filled with a “population of 184
discoverable devices (7.5 percent of which were susceptible to infection)”
within approximately half an hour; use of the BlueBag would reduce this
time nearly threefold.
During all of these experiments, “at no time did anyone stop us or suspect
us of doing something unusual, even in highly secured areas such as airports.”
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In a study for Symantec [18], Wright left 50 smartphones in 5 different
city locations (New York City, Washington D.C., Los Angeles, the San Fran-
cisco Bay Area, and Ottawa, Canada). Smartphones were left completely
unsecured in high-traffic, publicly accessible locations.
The smartphones contained 12 dummy apps, 4 of which were designed
to represent personal applications, 4 of which were designed to represent
business applications and data, and 4 of which were designed to be neutral.
Two of the business icons were “HR Cases” and “HR Salaries,” which were
given icons that indicated a PDF and an Excel spreadsheet, respectively. The
instrument was designed so that the researcher could record which apps were
opened. The “Contacts” app contained an entry with the tag “Me” on it;
this included a phone number and email address so that finders could contact
the owner of the smartphone directly. These attempts were also recorded.
The smartphones were left in the cities with full batteries within a period
of a few days. Data was collected for 7 days.
The author found that 96% (48/50) of the smartphones were accessed by
the finders of the devices; 70% of the smartphones had both business and
personal applications accessed. Only 50% of the finders contacted the owner
to attempt to return the smartphone.
Christin et al. [19] tested to see whether they could financially incentivize
users to run an unknown, untrusted binary. In their study, they created an
Amazon Mechanical Turk task where users were asked to run a “Distributed
Computing Client” from the “CMU Distributed Computing Project.” The
users were presented with a click-through consent form; however, downloads
and data collection were run from a third-party domain and no official CMU
websites acknowledged the existence of the project; this was done to mimic
what an attacker might try to do to disguise malware as a legitimate univer-
sity research study.
The program that participants ran collected some data about the user’s
system and displayed a timer that counted down for a period of time. Half of
the time, participants received a version of the binary that requested admin-
istrator access, a process that required the confirmation of a User Account
Control (UAC) prompt in Windows Vista and Windows 7.
The authors offered five versions of the study, differing only in compensa-
tion ($0.01, $0.05, $0.10, $0.50, and $1.00). Participants were only compen-
sated for their work once, and each version of the study was made available
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during a different week.
The authors found that a significantly larger fraction of users downloaded
and ran the executable when they were offered compensation of $0.50 or
$1.00. The authors did not find statistically significant differences in execu-
tion between the version of the program that required administrator access
(and thus the UAC dialog in some versions of windows) versus the version
that did not. Turkers who were paid more were also more likely to have
up-to-date operating systems.
The authors also performed a follow-up study in which participants self-
reported data. They found that the fraction of people who were expected
to have security expertise remained constant across all price brackets. In
addition, participants were asked to measure their perception of the risk of
running programs from Mechanical Turk using a 5-point Likert scale; on
average, participants who were compensated $0.50 or $1.00 perceived the
activity as riskier than those were paid less.
Greitzer et al. [20] discuss the unintentional insider threat (UIT) problem
and analyze a few related case studies. They define an unintentional insider
threat:
“An unintentional insider threat is (1) a current or former em-
ployee, contractor, or business partner (2) who has or had au-
thorized access to an organization’s network, system, or data
and who, (3) through action or inaction without malicious in-
tent, (4) unwittingly causes harm or substantially increases the
probability of future serious harm to the confidentiality, integrity,
or availability of the organization’s resources or assets, including
information, information systems, or financial systems.”
They also define social engineering in this context:
“Social engineering, in the context of information security, is ma-
nipulation of people to get them to unwittingly perform actions
that cause harm (or increase the probability of causing future
harm) to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the orga-
nization’s resources or assets, including information, information
systems, or financial systems.”
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The authors create a social engineering taxonomy based on interpersonal
interaction (or lack thereof) and means to accomplish goals (electronic or
non-electronic). The authors focus on attacks with interpersonal interaction
and electronic means because they are relevant to the UIT problem.
The authors also summarize demographic, organizational, and human fac-
tors that were previously discussed in the literature. “We created an incident
template to represent UIT social engineering incidents that we have collected
from sources such as Internet searches and reports referenced in the litera-
ture. Examples are described below (the full set of cases is reported in [32]).”
They are unable to conclude anything regarding demographics, but identify
potentially dangerous organizational and human factors. They create a “kill
chain” model for single- and multiple-stage phishing exploits as well as sys-
tem dynamics models of “Social Engineering of Insiders by Outsiders” and
“Avenues for Social Engineering Mitigation.”
The authors also provide mitigation and strategy recommendations.
2.2.1 Similar USB Flash Drive Studies
In this portion of the thesis, we discuss other experiments that involved
dropping USB flash drives as a means of attack. These attacks helped to
inform the design of our own experiment and provide information about
how effective these attacks are in general. We compare the results found
in these studies with our own in Section 3.3.9. We also describe a related
experiment that attempted to determine predictors of whether a participant
would attempt to return a dropped USB flash drive; this study also informed
our experimental setup. As a large portion of evidence for the effectiveness
of this attack is anecdotal, we present anecdotal evidence as well.
Anecdotal Evidence
One of the most-cited anecdotes about this topic is an article written by Steve
Stasiukonis [11]. In this article, Stasiukonis discusses penetration testing a
credit union. The author used promotional flash drives in the study; the
appearance of the flash drives is not discussed further. The author seeded the
drives in the parking lot, employee smoking areas, and “other areas employees
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frequented” early in the morning. Out of the 20 drives, 15 were ultimately
activated by an employee.
One proposal of this type of experiment [21] proposes a study with a sam-
ple size of 100 drives and notes that no comprehensive studies have been
completed about this effect. It also refers to this process as “USB baiting.”
The authors look to answer the following research questions:
• What is the tendency and reasoning for users to plugin a foreign USB
drive?
– Do different drop-off environments influence the infection rate?
• Which possible USB attack strategies are the most effective for suc-
cessful malicious code execution?
The drives used in the study would be loaded with content similar to that
of an administrative worker. The authors plan to actually exploit various
Windows vulnerabilities, although the flash drive’s malware will not actually
do anything malicious. As in other studies [14], the authors suggest using
HTTP as a callback mechanism to record activation events. They also sug-
gest notifying users that their machines are vulnerable and requesting their
feedback to determine why they activated the drives in the first place.
In another experiment, Wright [12] dropped 54 USB drives on the ground
and indicated the number of opens. He reported 32/54 (60%) of the drives
were opened and 3/54 (5%) of the drives were picked up by a subject who
contacted the owner without clicking on a file. There does not appear to be
more information about this experiment online.
Another study of interest can be found in a presentation given by Miles
McQueen [13]. In this study, the author distributed 50 flash drives (called
“road apples” in the presentation) in various outdoor locations at Idaho
National Lab. Each flash drive contained an autorun file and an executable
disguised as a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet of a salary survey. In the study,
34 of the 50 drives were returned by employees, while 10 were plugged into a
computer. In a follow-up study performed 14 months after the initial study
(and after employees were educated about social engineering), only 1 out of
the 50 dropped flash drives were activated.
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Peer-Reviewed Studies
In this section, we discuss studies that have been formalized to a greater
degree.
One of the most comprehensive studies of a USB flash drive attack can be
found in Jeffrey Jacobs’ master’s thesis [14]. In this study, Jacobs attempted
to answer two different research questions:
1. “Do USB flash drives remain an effective social-engineering vector for
cyber attacks targeting commercial computer systems?”
2. “Are USB flash drives an effective social-engineering vector for cyber
attacks targeting residential computer systems?”
His experiment was modeled after Stasiukonis [11]. In this experiment, 60
identical Memorex flash drives were dropped on public sidewalks and parking
areas in different areas of Maui, Hawaii. Of these drives, 30 were dropped in
residential locations, while the other 30 drives were dropped in commercial
locations; these two zones were differentiated geographically using data from
the Maui County Planning Commission. Jacobs chose to place 30 drives
in each area because it allowed him to verify with 95% confidence that the
drives had a 10% effectiveness rate.
The drives themselves were 128MB Memorex flash drives; they were col-
ored blue, gray, and white, although the distribution of these colors is not
provided in the thesis [14]. Attached to the drives was a printed label that
carried a unique first name and last initial pair. These names were selected
from an official list of common baby names for the year 1990; half of the
names were female and the other half were male. Gender neutral names were
not used to label devices.
Each drive contained 5 different HTML files with the names gallery.html,
resume.html, budget.html, bookmarks.html, and slideshow.html; their con-
tent was designed to resemble a student’s assignment. Each file also used
an image tag to reference a link containing a unique identifier and security
code; when this link was accessed (by loading the html file in a web browser),
Jacobs recorded the flash drive’s identifier, the file accessed, and the date and
time of access. Users were not identified, notified that they participated in a
study, or asked to provide any input. Instead, the experiment was designed
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to avoid distressing users by designing the files and links so that they did not
appear malicious.
The drives were distributed over three different days (Tuesday, Wednesday,
and Thursday) in January 2011; 10 drives were dropped in residential areas
and 10 were dropped in commercial areas on each day. Drives were placed
in different towns on different days and were recollected if they were not
picked up after 8 hours. Davis recorded activation for a device if one of
its corresponding URLs was accessed within 72 hours of the device being
dropped.
Davis found that 11 out of the 30 drives in each of the residential and com-
mercial populations were activated during the time frame that measurement
took place. The mean and median times between device drop and device
activation were 7.30 hours and 2.69 hours for the commercial population and
14.10 hours and 4.33 hours for the residential population. All but two of
those devices were activated within 28 hours; of the two remaining devices,
one was activated between 48 and 52 hours after the drop and the other was
activated between 56 and 60 hours after the drop. The author was unable to
make statistically significant conclusions about the impact on effectiveness of
the gender of the name displayed on the flash drive. Davis also attempted to
measure the impact of time of day and date on effectiveness but ultimately
noted that his experiment was not well-controlled enough to draw significant
conclusions.
Finally, we note a study that does not directly mirror the attacks we de-
scribe; however, it involves inconspicuously dropping flash drives, which has
a direct application to our experimental apparatus. It is meant as a modern
test of the lost-letter experiment [22], which was a study to determine popular
sentiment toward various groups at the time. In the lost-letter experiment,
Milgram, Mann, and Harter dropped letters addressed to various groups in
city locations. Each letter contained postage, so participants simply had to
put the letter in a mail box for it to be returned to the researcher. In this
experiment, the authors found that letters addressed to “Friends of the Nazi
Party” and “Friends of the Communist Party” were returned less often than
letters addressed to a person or “Medical Research Associates.”
Lastdrager et al. [23] modified the lost-letter technique to deal with USB
drives. The authors labeled some drives using both male or female names
and thesis or music labels and left a control group of drives in their original
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packaging. They dropped drives in buildings that had service desks or recep-
tionists; one student dropped drives while others observed people who picked
up the drives and if participants returned the drives to the service desk.
They recorded the time of drop-off, time before the drive was picked up,
the sex of the dropper, the sex and age of the participant, as well as the
participant’s number of companions, behavior, and whether the participant
was walking towards or away from the service desk. The authors found that
new (unopened) drives were returned less often and that drives were picked
up quickly.
The main predictors of theft turned out to be the subject’s apparent age
and whether the subject put the key in a personal container after picking it
up.
2.3 Human Decision-Making
This section contains literature discussing various studies detailing the human
decision-making process. This information was valuable and informed the
design of the survey instrument used in this study.
2.3.1 Risk Attitude Scales
Much academic work has been dedicated to surveying people’s perception
of risk. In one such study [24], Weber, Blais, and Betz describe a domain-
specific scale that measures risk attitudes in five different domains. These
domains were selected based on a meta-analysis of the literature and other
existing scales. The authors do not describe the process of choosing initial
item candidates in significant detail.
The items in this scale were refined over three different surveys. In the first
survey, Weber et al. presented a set of 101 different items that spanned the 5
categories. Each item was presented twice: once for the Risk-Behavior scale
(“... indicate your likelihood of engaging in each activity”) and once for the
Risk-Perception scale (“... indicate your gut level assessment of how risky
each situation is”). The authors then reduced the scale to 50 items by pick-
ing the 10 items from each subscale with the highest item-total correlations
for that subscale. The second survey was designed to establish test-retest
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reliability and validity. The third survey consisted of 64 items: the refined
50-item scale from Survey 1 (with some reworded items) and 14 additional
items designed to “improve item quality.” The scale was then reduced to 40
items by picking the 8 items from each subscale with the highest item-total
correlations.
In all surveys, items were interspersed with items from other subscales.
The order of the items was also randomized.
The authors also attempted to fit a 6-factor model to their results.
Weber et al. found strong support for the domain-specific nature of risk.
In addition, their results suggest that risk-taking is primarily driven by in-
dividuals’ perception of a particular risk, rather than their attitude towards
that risk.
In a future study [9], Blais and Weber reworded and refined their 40-
question scale so that it is now 30 questions long. We use this shortened
scale to measure domain-specific risk perception in this work.
Egelman and Peer [8] developed a scale that measures participants’ willing-
ness to follow good security advice. Using an iterative process, the authors
refined a list of 30 items found during literature review and discussion with
experts into a 16-item scale split into four subscales corresponding to device
securement, password generation, proactive awareness, and updating.
Participants in studies to refine the scale were taken from Amazon’s Me-
chanical Turk platform and were roughly representative of the U.S. online
population. The authors removed questions from the scale that were non-
applicable, had poor item-total correlations, or exhibited ceiling effects. Par-
ticipants did not appear to demonstrate any social desirability bias. After
sufficient refinement, the authors applied exploratory factor analysis to an
intermediate 24-item version of the scale and found four factors. Further
refinement removed 8 items from the scale and produced a scale with 16
items loaded across the four factors (each of which ultimately represented a
subscale). Overall, 3,619 participants were included in this process.
Egelman and Peer establish that this scale is reliable, displays discriminant
validity with regards to the Privacy Concern Scale [25], loads on the same
factors in multiple administrations, and displays test-retest reliability. After
correlation with other psychometric measures, the authors find that portions
of the DOSPERT correlated (albeit weakly) with their scale and that the
Consideration for Future Consequences scale [26] appeared to correlate best
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with their scale.
We include this scale in our survey because we wish to determine the self-
assessed security behaviors of participants who picked up the flash drives.
Some studies have alternately attempted to determine factors that explain
why an activity is perceived as risky. Fischhoff et al. [27] discuss an ap-
proach to determine whether something is “safe enough.” This approach,
called “expressed preferences,” “employs questionnaires to measure the pub-
lic’s attitudes towards the risks and benefits from various activities.” This is
in contrast to the “revealed preference” approach, which uses historical data.
“The goal of the present study is to evaluate the usefulness of questionnaire
techniques for investigating issues pertaining to risk-benefit tradeoffs.”
The authors used 76 members of the League of Women voters as partici-
pants in their study. Each participant was asked to rank and rate perceived
risks or perceived benefits of 30 different activities, as well as provide infor-
mation on “the acceptability of its current level of risk,” and “its position on
each of nine dimensions of risk.” For the ranking and rating task, partici-
pants were asked to rank the activities and assign ratings based on how they
compared to the least beneficial (or risky) item. These least beneficial items
were assigned a score of 10, and other items were to be scored proportionally
(i.e., “a rating of 12 indicates that the item is 1.2 times as beneficial as the
least beneficial item”).
For the “acceptability of risk” scale, participants were asked to judge
whether activities needed “serious action, such as legislation” to make them
safer, whether they could be more risky, or whether the current level of risk
was acceptable. In the first two cases, participants were asked to provide
multipliers.
Finally, participants were asked to provide ratings on 7-point Likert scales
for each of 9 factors that were “hypothesized to influence perceptions of
actual or acceptable risk.”
The authors found that “perceived risk declined slightly with overall ben-
efit,” which is a different result than other studies. “Perceived risk was
correlated 0.75 and 0.66 with risk adjustment factor ratings for the risk and
benefit groups, respectively.” The authors also inferred that “participants
in our study believed that more risk should be tolerated with more bene-
ficial activities.” The authors also found that many of the 9 factors were
intercorrelated, so they could be reduced to two factors. “One dimension ap-
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parently discriminated between high- and low-technology activities, with the
high end being characterized by new, involuntary, poorly known activities,
often with delayed consequences. The second dimension primarily reflected
the certainty of death given that adversity occurs.”
2.3.2 Correlates of Cybercrime Victimization
This section describes studies that examined the relationship between cyber-
crime victimization and either a survey or a combination of factors (which
may include a survey). This helped us to develop our survey instrument by
providing material for questions that could be correlated with picking up and
using the flash drives.
Only Surveys
Welsh and Lavoie [28] attempt to apply the Routine Activities Theory (RAT)
to the domain of cyberstalking. In this theory, described in [29], victimization
risk is modified by three significant factors: motivated offenders, suitable
targets, and effective guardianship (which represents attempts to prevent
the crime from occurring).
The authors analyzed survey responses from 321 female undergraduate
students. They measured the relative exposure of the respondents as tar-
gets by creating a 17-item survey that asked respondents to indicate how
frequently (on a 5-point Likert scale) they used the internet for different ac-
tivities. They also created a self-report Online Disclosure scale; for each of
24 different pieces of personal information, participants were asked to rate
(on a 5-point Likert scale) how likely they would be to reveal this informa-
tion on a social networking site. The authors used the 30-item DOSPERT
scale [9] to evaluate the participants’ risk attitudes. The Cyber-Obsessional
Pursuit (COP) scale [30, 31] was used to measure the participants’ extent of
cyber-stalking victimization experiences.
The authors found that Social risk taking in the DOSPERT was correlated
with cyberstalking victimization outcomes, as well as more time spent on
social networks and additional information disclosure.
Bossler and Holt [32] also attempt to apply RAT to explain cybercrime.
In this study, the authors analyzed 570 responses from a self-report survey
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of undergraduate students.
The authors measured victimization that caused respondents to lose com-
puterized data due to malware infection. Originally, the authors attempted
to measure how many times someone was victimized in the past 12 months,
but less than 7% of the sample was victimized more than twice; the authors
thus decided to treat the dependent variable as a dichotomy (no malware-
related loss versus malware-related loss) and attempt to determine which
activities and patterns are related to this loss.
In addition to various demographic questions (including internet connec-
tion speed), the authors asked respondents to describe how much time they
spent per week (on average) on six different types of activities online. Re-
spondents were also asked whether they avoided using online banking systems
or social networking websites.
Deviant computer behavior was measured by asking respondents how many
times in the past 12 months they committed software piracy, committed me-
dia piracy, watched pornographic or obscene materials, attempted to guess
someone else’s password, accessed someone’s computer without their knowl-
edge, modified or printed computer information without the owner’s knowl-
edge, and accessed another’s wireless internet connection without their per-
mission. The password, computer access, and modification questions were
averaged to create a “hacking score”; this score was averaged with the re-
maining four items to create a deviancy score.
Respondents were also asked questions that dealt with personal, physical,
and social guardianship. Personal guardianship was assessed by asking a sin-
gle question about the respondent’s computing skill level. Physical guardian-
ship was measured by asking respondents whether they had various types of
security software (or hardware firewalls) and whether they visited Microsoft
Update. Social guardianship was measured by asking respondents to choose
an item on a four-point scale that represented the fraction of their friends
that performed one of the items mentioned in the deviant computer behavior
scale (software piracy, media piracy, pornography, or hacking) in the past 12
months. As before, the hacking scale was made up of three averaged items.
The authors found that pirating media correlated with computer infection,
as well as having friends who viewed pornography. Personal and physical
guardianship are relatively insignificant in predicting infections that lead to
data loss.
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Ngo and Paternoster also attempt to link individual and situational level
factors to cybercrime victimization [33]. They operate from the Routine
Activity Theory and General Theory of Crime perspectives and attempt to
determine whether their components correlate with different types of cyber-
crime victimization. The seven chosen types of cybercrime victimization are
“computer virus, unwanted exposure to pornographic materials, sex solicita-
tion, online harassment by a stranger, online harassment by a non-stranger,
phishing and online defamation.”
Data for this study was collected via voluntary participation on a univer-
sity campus. A total of 295 students completed a survey; due to the univer-
sity’s commitment to a non-traditional degree program, participants were not
representative of “a typical U.S. university.” As the dependent variable, “re-
spondents were asked if they experienced each of the . . . forms of cybercrime
victimization in the past 12 months.” Respondents were asked to complete
a scale designed to measure self-control. Questions about participants’ fre-
quency of online activities (exposure to motivated offenders), participation
in potentially risky behaviors (target suitability), and experience in working
with computers and computer security configurations (capable guardianship)
were used to test the routine activities theory. As control data, the authors
also collected demographic info (sex, race, employment, and marital status)
and measured “computer deviance” by asking whether participants had per-
formed each of five different actions in the past 12 months.
The authors applied logistic regressions to their results. By regressing on
low self-control and holding control data constant, they found that low self-
control significantly correlated with both forms of harassment. Race, age, and
employment appeared to significantly predict some forms of victimization in
this regression. By regressing on the RAT measures and control data, they
found that time spent instant-messaging correlated to harassment by non-
strangers. Surprisingly, clicking and opening unknown links was negatively
correlated with virus infection, the measure of installed security software
was positively correlated with virus infection and harassment by a stranger,
and the measure of computer crime education was positively correlated with
unwanted pornography. The authors argue that the RAT results are weak,
especially considering the presence of multiple comparisons.
Both age and employment were found to negatively correlate with harass-
ment by a stranger. The computer deviance scale was positively correlated
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with harassment by a non-stranger, unwanted pornography, and phishing.
Other Risk Factors
Le´vesque et al. [34] provided 50 test subjects with laptops and monitored
their activities over the following four months. The laptops were configured
identically at the beginning of the study and contained a Trend Micro an-
tivirus product as well as other process exploration and anti-malware tools
and Perl scripts used to collect data about the experiment. The researchers
collected information about installed programs and browser plug-ins (and
available updates for programs), web browsing, internet connections, and
time usage.
The authors found that 38% of the users were exposed to malware that
was detected by the antivirus over the course of the study. The vast majority
(over 85%) of the detected malware was made up of Trojans. In addition,
20% of the users installed threats that were not detected by the antivirus.
The authors found that gender, age, employment status, and work/study
domain did not have any statistically significant impact on infection rate.
However, the authors did find that users with a high level of computer ex-
pertise (defined as users who “configured a home network, created a web
page, and installed or re-installed an operating system on a computer”) were
significantly more likely to be infected at least once than low-expertise users,
although they were not significantly more likely to see a larger number of
infections than low-expertise users.
Behaviorally, users who visited more websites and installed more applica-
tions were at a greater risk of being infected. The authors also found that
visits to media-sharing and pornographic sites were correlated with malware
infection, although sites that contained content relating to internet infras-
tructure and sports were more highly correlated with infection.
Levesque et al. also use this data [34] to develop a model that will predict
users’ risk of malware victimization [35]. As before, users whose computers
were infected at least once during the course of the study (n = 23) were
placed in the high risk group, while users who were not infected were placed
in the low risk group (n = 27). The goal of this study was then to predict
which risk category a user belonged in.
The authors used computer expertise, age, total number of hours connected
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to the internet, total number of web sites visited, number of files downloaded,
most used web browser, and the number of visits to {peer-to-peer, software
download, streaming media/mp3, email, social networking, pornography}
sites.
The authors built a MLP neural network out of this data, using 60% of
the data for training, 20% for test, and 20% for validation. Only 45 users’
data were used for this part. “We trained up to 20 models and selected the
one with the best predictive results.” The overall accuracy of this model was
80.85%. The authors do not consider this great prediction performance.
The authors intend to also do this with self-reported data. They are the
first to combine real-world usage data with social-demographic factors.
Canali et al. [36] attempt to predict the risk that a user will visit a mali-
cious web page based solely on their browsing data. To accomplish this, the
authors analyzed the 3-month user-initiated HTTP browsing data of 160,229
client machines (provided by Symantec), extracted 74 different attributes
that summarized this behavior, and then attempted to see if any of these
attributes effectively classified users as low-risk or high-risk. In this study,
low risk users never encountered malicious websites or blacklisted domains,
while high-risk users encountered at least two malicious URLs or three black-
listed domains. Malicious webpages were classified using various lists, and
were classified separately from blacklisted domains. This classification was
performed in an automated fashion on Symantec’s servers; the URLs were
anonymized by reducing them to their fully-qualified domain names for hu-
man analysis. Analysis was only run on clients who visited at least 100 web
pages over the time spanned by the data.
The authors found that users who visited more URLs, domains, and host-
names were more likely to visit malicious websites. In addition, visiting
pornographic and adult websites, surfing webpages with a top level domain
different than .com, .net, or .org, having a larger amount of web activity,
visiting fewer websites in the Alexa Top 500, and visiting web pages with a
larger number of languages were weakly correlated with risk.
Maier et al. [37] attempt to study the conventional wisdom that residen-
tial users often experience “compromise and infection” on their networks.
They also wished to study whether “security hygiene” (doing things like
frequently installing OS or antivirus updates) or risky behavior (accessing
URLs blacklisted by Google’s Safe Browsing API) correlated with signs of
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compromise. The authors “search for three behavioral indicators—address
scanning, port scanning, and spamming—and also monitor for network-level
signatures aimed at detecting three malware families, Zlob, Conficker, and
Zeus.”
The authors analyze traffic from four different sources: a European DSL
provider, a community network in rural India, dorm users in a large US
university, and LBNL. The authors found that residential systems displayed
a relatively low amount of malicious activity. They also found that accesses to
URLs that correspond with AV updates or Windows Update did not impact
the likelihood of being infected with malware, while connecting to malicious
sites (that their browsers should have warned them about) increases the risk
that a computer is infected with malware.
Yen et al. [38] study malware encounters in a large enterprise. They used
McAfee anti-virus reports on 85,000 machines, as well as Windows authenti-
cation logs, web proxy logs, VPN logs, and the employee database to provide
information about properties of malware compromise.
The authors limit their analysis to hosts that are logged onto by one user
most (80%) of the time. They observed the enterprise over 4 months and
found that of 62,884 primary-user-identified machines, 9,625 generated mal-
ware reports.
By looking at the file system location where malware is found, the authors
identify that external drives are the most prevalent location of malware en-
counters. However, both the malware encounter rate and the file system
location distribution depend on the country that the hosts are located in.
Most malware reports reach the central data collector more than 10 minutes
after infection is detected, suggesting that hosts most frequently encounter
malware outside of the network. However, this factor also differs by geogra-
phy.
A user’s distance from the CEO in the corporate hierarchy and the tech-
nicality of their job title positively correlate with malware encounters. The
authors argue that this is the case because lower-ranked users may be more
technical.
The authors match 390 McAfee reports with web proxy logs and find that
most of the malware in this data set comes from innocuous categories (e.g.,
“Business”) and was allowed through the proxy.
The authors also built a logistic regression model using demographic, VPN
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activity, and web activity features. They find that, among other features, a
user’s rank, the technicality of a user’s job title, the total number of domains a
user has visited, and the number of HTTP connections to chat, file transfer,
social networking, and non-categorized sites a user has visited contribute
significantly to the model. When the authors applied their model with all 20
features combined, the top 1000 riskiest hosts (as predicted by the model)
had a malware encounter rate of 51% (as compared to 15% for the entire
enterprise).
2.3.3 Perceived Risk
This subsection describes studies that examined perceived risk. This infor-
mation serves to highlight the current state of knowledge of how “normal”
populations perceive risk.
Correlated Factors
In [39], Garg and Camp conduct a survey to determine what factors primarily
influence risk perception; to accomplish this, they used Fischhoff et al.’s nine-
dimensional model [27]. Example dimensions include immediacy (whether
the threat happens immediately or later in time), knowledge to the exposed,
and severity of consequences.
In the survey, participants were asked to rank fifteen different security and
privacy-related phrases in order of perceived risk. Example terms included
“identity theft,” “cookies,” and “virus.” Participants were also asked to rate
each item they were familiar with for each of the 9 dimensions; ratings were
done on a 5-point scale, where the meaning of a particular value varied based
on the dimension being studied. 93 participants were surveyed as a conve-
nience sample at Indiana University; the authors argue that the literature
suggests that the use of this convenience sample should not significantly limit
their results because other studies have found out that gender and age did
not correlate with different perceived risk scores.
The authors found that the original nine-dimensional model explained a
relatively small percentage of the variance in risk perception. They reduced
this model to four dimensions and determined that the temporal impact di-
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mension (which consisted of the combination of the “newness” and “common-
dread” dimensions) was the most significant.
LeBlanc and Biddle [40] also attempt to adapt Fischhoff’s model [27] to
the computer realm. They included “five non Internet-related activities, and
15 Internet-related activities” in this scale and measured perceived benefit,
perceived risk (where the risk was defined as “loss of personal information”
instead of death as in [27]), likelihood, immediacy, delay, severity, and fre-
quency of usage on 7-point Likert scales. Ninety-four participants on Me-
chanical Turk were asked to respond to the survey.
The authors divided various activities into different categories. Activi-
ties that involved “potential for embarrassment” were ranked higher on the
likelihood scale than on the severity scale; “financial” risks were generally
judged to have greater severity and “other” activities lay in the middle of
the line. PCA on the two scales with two factors was inconclusive. Hierarchi-
cal clustering using complete agglomeration revealed that activities generally
fall into the three categories originally speculated by the researchers. Users
also appeared to believe that “activities with a certain amount of risk would
be paired with a relatively quick loss of personal information in the event
that an attack took place.” Users seem to believe that some activities (such
as online banking and using search engines) are relatively unlikely to cause
information loss.
Evidence of Attitudes
Felt, Egelman, and Serge [41] survey users about their opinions about various
risks associated with privileges in smartphones. The authors argue that
existing resource permission warnings were “not grounded in user research
as far as we are aware, and usability problems have emerged as a result.”
In this paper, the authors “performed two surveys to rank the level of user
concern about a wide range of smartphone resources. In our first survey, we
asked 3,115 smartphone users to rate their level of concern about 99 risks
corresponding to 54 smartphone permissions.” “We also asked users about
past negative experiences with applications to measure the frequency of risks.
In our second survey, we asked 42 smartphone users to state their reactions
to low-ranked, medium-ranked, and high-ranked risks.”
In the first study, respondents were asked to provide a response on a 5-
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point Likert scale (ranging from “Indifferent” to “Very Upset”) of how upset
they would be if an app performed a particular activity “without asking
you first.” Each respondent only saw 12 of the 99 possible questions. They
were also asked “to tell us about instances in which they had uninstalled
‘misbehaving’ applications.” In the second survey, respondents were asked
to provide information about how they would feel, why, and what they would
do for each risk that they were presented. Each respondent saw one of the
top three risks from the first survey, one of the middle three, and one of
the bottom three. Risks were ranked by the fraction of participants who
answered “Very upset” in the first study.
The authors found that users were primarily concerned about risks that
caused financial damage or permanent damage to data. In the case of these
high-concern risks, users expressed willingness to perform actions such as
contacting the authorities or pursuing legal action (19% and 12% on aver-
age, respectively); conversely, 21% of respondents were willing to do nothing
for the low-ranked risks. The authors also note in particular that location
information “is not a high-ranked user concern.”
Chin et al. [42] present the results of semi-structured interviews with
60 participants. These interviews were designed to determine how willing
users were to handle sensitive information on their smartphones versus their
computers and “why and how they select applications, which provides infor-
mation about how users decide to trust applications.”
In these interviews, participants were asked to fill out surveys about the
demographics of their smartphone and laptop usage (“how many applications
are installed on the device”), asked to “rank the factors he/she used when
selecting. . . applications” using card sorting, asked to record information on
installed applications for each device, interviewed about their willingness to
perform nine tasks on each device, and asked to compare the magnitude
of their privacy and security concerns between their smartphones and lap-
tops and to verbally explain their “primary concerns” in the case of their
smartphones.
The authors found that users were less willing to work with online shop-
ping, online banking, health information, and their SSNs on their smart-
phones. About 10 out of the 60 participants specifically cited security reasons
for why they would not perform the activity on their smartphones (except
for SSNs, where 36/60 people cited them). “Participants are more concerned
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about privacy on their phones.” Participants were often worried about phone
loss, frequently citing important data that was stored on the phone and “ex-
pressed doubt in the trustworthiness of the applications.” The authors also
found that users were more willing to experiment with applications in the
mobile realm. They make various recommendations to improve mobile ap-
plication stores.
Flinn and Lumsden [43] ran a survey to begin to explore “the extent of
users’ awareness, knowledge, and range of perspectives concerning” “ privacy
and security tools available in contemporary Web browsers.” The authors
also wanted to explore anecdotes in the field. Users were asked personal
and computer demographic questions, as well as “the same pattern of five
questions for each of the four technologies of interest (secure sites, cookies,
privacy policies and trust marks).”
“The first question in each section asked whether the respondent
had any previous knowledge of the technology; only when respon-
dents indicated that they had previously heard of it were they
required to complete the rest of the questions in the associated
section. The second question in each section asked respondents to
describe in a few brief sentences what they understood about the
technology. The third probed their beliefs about the technology
by listing a number of statements pertaining to the technology
and asking them to indicate the degree to which they agreed or
disagreed with each statement; the statements and the five-point
Likert scale response options for each were collectively presented
using a matrix-style format. The fourth question assessed respon-
dents’ familiarity with the technology in question, and the fifth
explored the degree to which respondents’ feelings of security and
privacy depend on the technology.”
A total of 237 users were surveyed.
The authors found that respondents interpreted the phrase “secure site”
in two different ways: whether the site contains a “secure connection,” or
whether the site’s “hosts, servers and databases” were secure; users tended
to trust the latter more. Generally, users appeared to have significant mis-
conceptions about how secure sites worked, understood cookies better than
other technologies, were “skeptical” of privacy policies (but believed that
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their creators followed them), and were less aware of how to effectively verify
trust marks.
Friedman et al. [44] conducted a study where “Seventy-two individuals, 24
each from a rural community in Maine, a suburban professional community
in New Jersey, and a high-technology community in California, participated
in an extensive (2-hour) semi-structured interview about Web security.” In
part of the survey, participants were asked to identify their “concerns about
risks and harms from Web use.” Suburban individuals identified risks to
people (“concerns related to human experience, social relations, or societal
issues”) more than the other groups, and high-tech individuals identified
information risks (“concerns related to the quality, use, and protection of
information”) more than the other groups. “Across the three communities
(that varied with respect to technological expertise and education), users
most often emphasized security, privacy, and threat to computer systems.”
Koved et al. [45] discuss new risks in security that are created by new
mobile device adoption. The authors completed a study that had users indi-
cate “the security risks they perceive when using mobile devices” in “specific
scenarios,” “including the use of an app and the web to do personal banking,
accessing confidential company information, accessing medical information,
and using a credit card with an unknown online retailer.”
“The four primary categories of risk emerging from the study
are: shoulder surfing, network attacks, compromise of the device,
and untrustworthy remote service providers. All of the identified
risk factors relate to the loss of personal or confidential informa-
tion, including passwords. Larger consequences of loss, including
access to personal or company accounts, financial loss, identity
theft, and publication of private information, were also identified
by the study participants. Another category identified by respon-
dents is risk associated with using a mobile device in a particular
situation, e.g. personal safety.”
The authors now intend to determine where actual risks and perceived risks
are mismatched and “where there is a mismatch, risk communication with
the user will be considered as a means to align user and system perceptions
of risk.” The authors hope that “there is greater likelihood that users will
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accept and comply with organizational security requirements such as multi-
factor authentication methods,” which they argue are necessary in the mobile
realm.
2.3.4 Online Behaviors
This subsection describes studies that examined the correlation between fac-
tors and online security behaviors. This information also helped to inform
the design of the survey instrument.
Correlated Factors
Onarlioglu et al. [46] attempted to measure how internet users reacted when
faced with concrete web security scenarios. To do this, they created 44 dif-
ferent scenarios in three different test suites (web-based attacks, email-based
attacks, and file sharing-related attacks). While participants were told that
the study would take about an hour, participants were allowed to leave the
study and resume their progress at any point. Participants were not com-
pensated; the survey was promoted as an opportunity for participants to
test their security knowledge and get feedback. A total of 164 participants
completed the survey, although the file-sharing suite was only given to partic-
ipants who had encountered BitTorrent or one-click hosting services before.
In most of the tests, participants were presented with screenshots of vari-
ous scenarios and were asked to indicate their risk perception of the scenario
on a 5-point Likert scale; furthermore, participants were asked whether they
would perform the relevant activity (such as clicking a link or download-
ing a file) and why. In one part of the file sharing tests, participants were
directed to interactive torrent download pages reproduced from The Pirate
Bay and isoHunt and asked to click on the real download link (as opposed to
advertisement banners masquerading as download links). A similar test was
applied for the one-click hosting providers.
The authors divided the participants into three different groups for anal-
ysis. Non-techies are users who worked in non-technical fields and had little
to no programming experience. Techies are users in technical fields who
have not focused on computer security. Experts are users who are computer
security professionals.
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The authors formed a security score by calculating the number of ques-
tions a participant correctly avoided as malicious (or correctly followed as
benign), normalized (to account for the fact that some participants did not
complete the file sharing tests) and scaled from 0-100. They also created
a risk perception score by correctly identifying risky situations as risky and
benign situations as low-risk. This score was also normalized and scaled from
0-100.
Analysis indicated that while the non-techies and experts differed signif-
icantly in both their risk perception and security scores, techies did not
differ significantly from either of the other groups. Techies and experts
only had higher scores at a statistically significant level on the web-based
attacks. They also found that the risk perception score positively corre-
lated with the security score, although this correlation was weaker for non-
techies (ρ = 0.5, p = 9.99 · 10−6) than the combination of techies and experts
(ρ = 0.70, p = 6.51 · 10−15). Demographic data also did not appear to affect
the security score.
In the trick banner tests, non-techies performed significantly worse than
techies and experts. Non-techies also demonstrated that they did not have a
solid understanding of URL-shortening services.
Milne et al. [47] looked at the relationship between online risk and online
behaviors using a protection motivation theory approach, which states that
“consumers’ motivation to protect themselves depends on the
severity of the threat, perceived likelihood of the threat, and self-
efficacy. Self-efficacy is defined as one’s belief in their ability or
capacity to accomplish a task or deal with changes such that their
actions will have the desired outcome.”
The authors looked at adaptive behaviors, which are “actions taken with
a business to keep information safe” and maladaptive behaviors, which are
“avoidance responses that are driven more by a general fear of online shop-
ping.” They also hypothesize that perceived online privacy threat and per-
ceived likelihood of online privacy threat decrease the likelihood that par-
ticipants will engage in risky behaviors. They also expect self-efficacy to
moderate this relationship by weakening the link between these scales and
risky behaviors and enhancing the link between these scales and protective
behaviors.
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Questions for the survey were drawn from the literature and refined with
the help of expert survey researchers and a pretest sample of 45 college
students. Participants for the actual survey were recruited from an opt-in
consumer survey panel; the authors received 449 complete responses from
4000 requests. The authors used PCA to divide 49 behaviors into risky and
protective groups.
The authors found “a positive relationship between perceived online threat
and maladaptive behaviors and a positive relationship between likelihood of
threat and adaptive behaviors,” as well as “a positive relationship between
adaptive and maladaptive behaviors.” Self-efficacy was also found to cor-
relate with more adaptive behaviors and fewer maladaptive behaviors, and
fewer risky behaviors taken. However, the authors also found that perceived
online privacy threat or likelihood of online privacy threat did not have a
significant impact on risky behavior. However, perceived likelihood of on-
line privacy threat did have a marginally significant (p < 0.10) impact on
protective behavior. The authors suspected positive response bias towards
protective activities versus risky ones.
Vance et al. [48] measure the effectiveness of observing an electrical com-
ponent in the brain using electroencephalography (EEG) as a predictor for
actual risk behavior. The authors argue that this approach is promising
because self-reported risk perception data has been found to correlate little
with actual risk behavior in other work.
Brains were measured by having participants complete the Iowa Gambling
Task, a game where participants select cards from one of four decks. The
values on the cards represent either gains or losses of money; the decks are
arranged with different expected values. Participants are asked to determine
which decks “yield the most money in the long run.” Participants’ risk
attitudes are determined based on which decks they pick.
Participants were asked also asked to complete what they were told was
an image categorization task on their personal (or the researchers’ personal)
computers. Periodically, users were given security warnings that were sim-
ilar to Google Chrome’s when a malicious website is accessed. Users who
accepted the warning were penalized in terms of their performance for the
task. The authors also received a simulated security incident in the middle
of the test where a malware-esque screen appeared.
The authors found that none of the self-reported measures of risk per-
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ception accurately predicted security warning disregard but that the EEG
measures did successfully predict it before the security incident.
Rhee et al. [49] attempt to apply social cognitive theory, which deals
with “how perceptions of self-efficacy affect people’s motivation and action”
[50] (cited in [49]) to understand factors that influence good user security
behaviors; they do so because they believe that other work primarily focused
on deterring specific bad user behaviors. The punitive approach does not
effectively control users’ accidental security mistakes.
The authors hypothesize that general controllability, security breach inci-
dents, and computer/internet experience all influence (domain-specific) self-
efficacy in information security, which then influences security technology
adoption, behavior, and intention to strengthen security effort.
A total of 415 graduate students in business participated in a self-report
study where they were asked items from scales adapted from the literature
to measure each of the items in the model. The authors built a structural
model based on the results and found that all of the hypothesized relation-
ships existed in a statistically significant form. Computer/internet experi-
ence most strongly affected self-efficacy, which in turn primarily influenced
security technology adoption.
Benenson et al. [51] tested to see whether Facebook users were more
likely to click on suspicious links than users who used emails. In their study,
they sent users a short message connected to an individualized link and
recorded whether users clicked that link. The authors also “invited all study
participants to take a survey with several questions about their handling
of messages from strangers, their perception of Facebook’s security and the
reasons why they clicked or not clicked on the link in our message.” In
both cases, subgroups were formed based on the gender of the sender and
receiver; a “neutral” gender (email address) was possible with email but not
with Facebook. In the case of Facebook, three different levels of privacy
settings were used with each profile and the researchers sent recipients friend
requests half of the time. The experiment used 240 Facebook and 158 email
participants and 339 participants participated in the post-survey.
The researchers found that participants were significantly more likely (56%
vs 35%) to click on the link if responding via email. Participants were also
more likely to respond to the message if it was on Facebook. However, profile
appearance, the presence of a friend request, or gender of either the sender
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or receiver did not affect click rate. Only 17% of all participants reported
clicking on the link in the survey, while 39% of all participants actually clicked
the link in practice.
“65% of all survey respondents (220) said that they do not click
on Facebook links in messages from unknown senders. Moreover,
67% (228) of all respondents said that they do not click on links
in the emails from unknown senders. In the experimental setting,
62% of all Facebook recipients did not click, and 44% of all email
receivers did not click on the link.”
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CHAPTER 3
USB EXPERIMENT
In this chapter, we present the methodology and results from our USB flash
drive experiment. The matter in this chapter is designed to provide an answer
to our first and third research questions:
• Is this attack viable in the real world? In other words, do people
actually pick up the USB sticks and place them in their computers? If
so, how often does this happen?
• Does this behavior change based on the appearance of the drive, where
it is placed, or when it is placed?
3.1 Methodology
3.1.1 Technical Setup
In this experiment, we used a methodology similar to the one in Jacobs’
thesis [14]. We dropped flash drives with varying appearances and varying
contents in varying locations across the University of Illinois campus. Each
drive only contained HTML files and folders; each file contained multiple
extensions (e.g., “resume.pdf.html”) so that operating systems that hide file
extensions by default would display names that imply other file types (e.g.,
“resume.pdf”). Each HTML file contained an img tag that referenced a server
that the researchers control; when this file is loaded in a web browser, the
URL specified by the img tag is accessed, allowing our central server to record
that the file has been opened by the user. The HTML file itself contains a
debriefing page that indicates to the user that they have participated in an
experiment and allows them to consent or withdraw from the study. Users
are also provided a link to a survey that they could participate in to provide
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information about why they picked up the drive; users who completed this
additional step were compensated $10.
To manage the complexity of a physical experiment of this size, we devel-
oped multiple pieces of software to coordinate portions of the experiment.
First, we developed software to transform a specification of an experiment
(drive configurations, locations, times of day, and researchers) into a schedule
where each researcher was assigned some drives (with defined configuration
and location) to drop during each drop period. This schedule also divided
drives among the different categories used in the experiment. We also wrote
another program to send this schedule data to our central server and to use
it to program the USB flash drives. In order to more closely track the where-
abouts of drives in the field, we developed an Android app that was used
while drives were placed. Researchers used the app to store a picture of
where the drive was dropped and its GPS coordinates to the central server,
allowing them to check to see whether the drives were moved at a later time.
Two screenshots of the app, demonstrating the UI for an initial drop and a
drive status update, are shown in Figure 3.1.
3.1.2 Distribution of Drives
We present this section to describe how we divided the 300 drives among
various parameters in the experiment.
We were primarily interested in determining the effects of the time of day
that the drive was dropped and the appearance of the drive on pickup rates.
As a result, we chose five different appearances of drives and two types of
drop times (“morning” and “afternoon”). We wished to test each possible
combination of these two variables, so that 300
2·5 = 30 drives were dropped for
each appearance and drop time.
We also selected 30 locations to drop drives. These locations were chosen
based on two factors; first, we divided the University of Illinoiscampus into
three parts using east-west streets (“North,” “Main,” and “South” quads, re-
spectively) and chose 10 locations in each part. We then chose locations that
belonged to each of five sub-categories (“Parking Lot,” “Hallway,” “Outside,”
“Academic Room,” and “Common Room”); each part of campus contained
two locations in each category.
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(a) A screenshot of the interface
to drop a drive. All parameters
except the note field and picture
are automatically scheduled and
provided to the dropper;
droppers take their own pictures
using their phones and press the
“Submit” button to register the
GPS coordinates and picture of
the drop with our servers.
(b) A screenshot of the interface
to update the status of a
dropped drive. All fields except
the drop status dropdown and
note field are provided to the
dropper automatically.
Figure 3.1: Screenshots of the Android app used in the experiment.
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As we had 30 drives of each appearance and drop time and 30 locations, we
simply dropped one drive of each appearance and drop time in each location.
3.1.3 Drive Types
To explore our third research question (“does this behavior change for dif-
ferent drives with different contents”), we chose to drop five different types
of drives (see Figure 3.2). One of the drives was left unlabeled, as a control
(None drives). The remaining four drive types were divided into two groups,
with two types related to self-interested behavior and two types related to
altruistic behavior.
For the self-interest drives, we chose to label drives with labels related
to confidential information (“Confidential,” Confidential drives) and final
exam solutions (“Final Exam Solutions,” Exams drives). We chose final
exam solutions in particular because professors tend to distribute previous
midterm solutions but closely guard (and re-use questions from) finals; as a
result, previous finals are more difficult to find and thus represent a greater
opportunity to students and a greater risk to faculty and staff. Confidential
information serves to satisfy students’ curiosity. These two configurations
also represent different self-interest risk-reward tradeoffs. Students caught
possessing final exam solutions could face academic integrity charges or ex-
pulsion, while students caught possessing other confidential data would likely
face fewer significant consequences. However, final exam solutions are more
valuable to students than arbitrary confidential data.
In order to test participants’ tendency towards altruism, some drives were
attached to key chains that contained a few scrap keys (Keys drives). Other
experiments [52] have argued that participants who attempt to return keys
do so for altruistic reasons. In this experiment, we hoped that the absence of
identifying information would encourage participants to plug the flash drive
into a computer in an attempt to identify the owner and return the keys.
Another group of drives had the same keys attached, although the drives
also had a paper label providing contact information for a fake e-mail address
controlled by the researchers (Return Label drives).
We added this separate group of drives to see whether participants would
still plug in the drives even when provided with proper contact information.
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(a) An
unlabeled drive.
(b) A drive with
keys attached.
(c) A drive with
a return label
attached. (d) A
confidential
drive.
(e) An exams
drive.
Figure 3.2: Pictures of the five drive types.
Each drive was loaded with contents that matched its label. These folder
structures are shown in more detail in Figure 3.3. All files placed on the
drives were HTML documents; each document contained the same content
of the debriefing page and the link to the survey. Documents contained a
spurious “file extension” at the end of the file name (e.g., “resume.pdf.html”);
this was done to mislead careless readers. Some operating systems (primarily
Microsoft Windows) will also hide file extensions for known file types; users
who have this option enabled will see the filename without the extension
(“resume.pdf”), further adding to the deception.
Confidential-labelled drives contained three folders designed to indicate
that the resulting drive belonged to an employee (“2015 proj1,” “employee,”
“strategy”). These folders contained file names that implied a proposal and
patent application, two termination notices, and two sets of meeting notes
and a plan for the future, respectively.
Exam-labelled drives contained a list of folders that represented semesters
(“sp10,” “fa10,” . . . , “sp15”). Each folder contained documents labelled
“examA.pdf.html,”“examB.pdf.html,”“solutionsA.pdf.html,”and
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(a) The contents of unlabeled, keys,
and return label drives.
(b) The contents of confidential
drives.
(c) The contents of exams drives.
Note that only one folder is
expanded for brevity; all other
folders contain the same file names.
Figure 3.3: Pictures of the folder structures of each of the drive types.
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“solutionsB.pdf.html,” to represent different versions of an exam. We inten-
tionally omitted any reference to a particular class in order to avoid deterring
students who would have little interest in a particular class’s exam solutions.
All other drives contained a set of folders and files that were designed to
mimic a typical student’s personal flash drive. These drives contained three
folders: “Documents,” “Math Notes,” and “Pictures”; each folder contained
appropriate content.
3.1.4 Locations
We chose to drop drives in 30 different locations on the University of Illinois
campus. The large number of locations was chosen to help avoid arousing
suspicion by minimizing the chances that a participant would notice more
than one drive while making a particular tip on campus. The campus was
divided into three parts (“North,” “Main,” and “South”) based on a campus
map [53]; 10 locations were selected from each of these parts.
We also chose to place drives in five different categories of locations; these
were divided equally among sub-campuses (i.e., 2 locations per sub-campus
belonged to each category). The categories are as follows: Outdoor loca-
tions represent sidewalks and pedestrian areas in various portions of campus.
Parking Lot locations represent various parking lots on campus; the Uni-
versity of Illinois requires students to have a permit to access many spaces in
these lots from 6am to 5pm (and provides meters for short-term parking oth-
erwise). Parking is otherwise free, exempting 2am-6am Monday-Thursday
[54]. Two of the lots used in the study (C9 and F28) allow for overnight
parking on the weekends, and all of the lots except one (F28) are primar-
ily intended for faculty and staff use. We chose to choose lots that focused
on faculty and staff because we assumed that they would tend to walk be-
tween classes less than students would, causing them to be underrepresented
in the outdoor sample. Academic Room locations represent large lecture
halls or library floor space on the University of Illinois campus. We include
two libraries in this sample: one on the northern part of the campus that
serves primarily engineering students, and the main undergraduate library.
We omit the main library because it is located next to the undergraduate
library on the University of Illinois campus. Common Room locations
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represent food courts and publicly accessible locations where students, fac-
ulty, and staff may congregate. We include a publicly accessible cafeteria
in a research building on the north campus, the lobby of the engineering
academic advising building, two lobbies of fitness complexes, the lobby of an
undergraduate dorm, and the main food court in the student union in this
category. Hallway locations include the hallways and corridors of various
academic buildings.
We attempted to represent students, faculty, and staff in these locations.
Locations that would be visited by students of varying types of majors were
included.
3.1.5 USB Survey
In order to collect data about why users picked up the flash drives and to
collect data about their risk attitudes, we offered participants who picked up
flash drives the opportunity to complete a survey about their risk attitudes
for an additional $10 in compensation. We discuss the contents of this survey
in more detail in Section 4.1.
3.1.6 Experimental Procedures
This experiment was performed from April 27 to May 1, 2015. These five days
span Monday through Friday, and represent a normal week of classes at the
University of Illinois. The last day of scheduled classes at Illinois (before finals
week) was May 7. On April 27 and 28 (Monday and Tuesday), researchers
dropped 150 flash drives on each day. We performed drops during the first two
days of the week to reduce the chances that drives would remain on campus
during the weekends, when pedestrian traffic patterns change. Drives were
dropped in two groups; one group of drives was dropped between the hours
of 6am and 10am, and another group of drives was dropped between 1pm
and 5pm. We separated these groups by four hours to capture two different
behaviors; the morning group was designed to be picked up by faculty and
staff going to work, students going to morning classes, and both groups going
to lunch. The afternoon group was designed to be picked up by participants
who were leaving classes and work. Researchers were not given specific times
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to drop specific drives; instead, they were asked to place all of their drives
within the specified four-hour period. Researchers were assigned drops that
were clustered together geographically to reduce transportation cost and were
asked to drop drives in all of their assigned locations on each day to spread
out responsibility.
Researchers were instructed to drop drives in plain sight. They were also
informed of the protocol that Lastdrager et al. used in [23] to deposit drives:
“One student would walk around and pretend to tie his/her shoelaces, look
around to see if anybody noticed him/her and drop the USB key before
walking away.” However, as we wished to record the location of the drives
using the mobile phone app, researchers were asked to open their phones
and record the location of the drive before walking away. As smartphone
use in public spaces is extremely common, we believe that this additional
recording step was unlikely to arouse suspicion. Researchers were also asked
to occasionally travel in groups with friends to reduce the chances that they
would arouse suspicion. One example of a picture submitted to our database
can be found in Figure 3.4.
Researchers were also asked to periodically monitor the drives that they
dropped. Researchers submitted updates using the smartphone application,
indicating that the drive that they were looking for was either not found,
found (in the same location as dropped), or moved (visible, but not in the
same location as when dropped). Researchers were instructed not to touch
or move the drives and not to interact with any subjects.
In order for us to make meaningful conclusions about the times when
drives were picked up, any drive that was dropped during a time period
was monitored in the time period immediately following. After this initial
monitoring step, drives were monitored daily during the time period in which
they were originally dropped. Drives were monitored until they were not
found or until May 1, whichever occurred sooner.
3.2 Ethics
As this study required interaction with human subjects, we submitted our
project to the University of Illinois’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). We
obtained IRB approval (represented internally as protocol #15445) before
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Figure 3.4: A picture of a flash drive placed on a bench outside. This image
was uploaded to our database.
44
fielding the study.
In order for us to determine whether a population is generally susceptible
to our attack, we must present it as an attacker would in the real world. As
such, we employed deception in this work: we misrepresented the contents
of the USB stick using labels and other attachments (such as keys) to give
people the impression that they are picking up someone’s USB flash drive
instead of a research device for a study.
In order to minimize risks to the participants, we attempted to ensure
that our USB flash drives will not interact negatively with the participant’s
system. We did not execute any code on participants’ systems; the only files
that were stored on the drive were HTML pages that did not contain any
scripts.
If a user opened an HTML page stored on the drive, we used the “img”
tag to open a URL on a site that we control; this URL was crafted so that
it is unique for each HTML file on each USB drive. This information al-
lowed us to track which USB drives have been activated by users. This
HTML represented a debriefing form. After reading this form, participants
could withdraw themselves from the study or complete a follow-up survey to
determine their motivations for picking up the flash drive.
With this in mind, the debrief employed in this study may have caused
psychological distress in users who feel that they have been tricked. If the
contents of the USB drives are somehow infected, we could have caused
damage to the participants’ computer systems. In addition, if our website was
compromised, we could cause damage to the participants’ computer systems
by accidentally directing them to a malicious website.
We purchased drives from a reputable vendor. We used Device Manager
in Windows to perform a set spot-checks on a sample of the devices and did
not notice any unusual values for the vendor and device IDs. We believe
that the risk posed by this experiment exists for any person who buys a flash
drive from a reputable vendor. As this risk is no more than existing risk, this
experiment is minimal risk.
During the experiment, we directed participants to contact us or the IRB
if they had any questions, concerns, or complaints. We did not receive any
negative feedback from participants; conversely, some participants who re-
turned flash drives to us expressed their appreciation for the research and
asked about our results.
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3.3 Results
In this section, we discuss the results of our USB flash drive experiment. Data
from this experiment was downloaded from the central server on August 31,
2015, for analysis.
3.3.1 Consent and Use in Data Analysis
As our study dealt with human participants, we provided subjects with the
opportunity to consent to or withdraw from our data collection. We provided
this choice using buttons on the debriefing page when participants opened a
file on the flash drive.
We promised participants that “all data about the flash drive” would be
deleted if they withdrew from the study or did not consent to have their
data collected. As such, we do not include information about the times the
drives were opened, what files were opened on the drives, or the user agent
strings of each user’s browser for participants who did not consent to or who
withdrew from the study. However, we do collect aggregate data about the
fact that a file on the flash drive was opened, including which categories the
opened drive belongs to.
3.3.2 Multiple Comparisons
As the majority of this work involves tests for equal proportions with small
numbers of drives, we believe that applying standard corrections for multi-
ple comparisons (such as the Bonferroni correction) would require very large
differences of proportions to mark any of the population differences as statis-
tically significant. As one example, 20 comparisons would require p < 0.0025
to be statistically significant; in two groups of 60 drives, if one group had
30 successful members, the other would require under 14 or more than 46
successes to be statistically significantly different.
We choose to trade off the risk of a false positive in this study with the
risk of marking a real result as not significant by reporting statistical tests
in this category using the uncorrected convention (p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p <
0.01). We instead emphasize the exploratory nature of the study and report
explicit p values whenever possible.
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3.3.3 Number of Opens by Category
In this section, we compare the open rates of various parameters of the ex-
periment to see if any of the experimental parameters appears to influence
the rate at which people pick up the flash drives and plug them into their
computers.
Flash Drive Label
As discussed previously, we dropped five different types of flash drives with
different physical appearances. The open rates for each of these types are
shown in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2.
Table 3.1: Opens by flash drive label. Almost all categories of drives were
equally effective, with the exception of drives with a return label.
Label Dropped Opened Fraction Opened
Confidential 58 29 0.50
Exams 60 30 0.50
Keys 60 32 0.53
None 60 27 0.45
Return Label 59 17 0.29
Table 3.2: Differences in open fraction by flash drive label. Every other
type of drive is significantly more effective than drives with a return label.
Confidential Exams Keys None Return Label
Confidential 0 -0.033 (p=0.859) 0.05 (p=0.719) 0.212 (p=0.031)
Exams -0.033 (p=0.855) 0.05 (p=0.715) 0.212 (p=0.0295)
Keys 0.083 (p=0.465) 0.245 (p=0.0114)
None 0.162 (p=0.101)
Return Label
First, it is relevant to note that all drive appearances experienced some
degree of success in convincing participants to pick them up and plug them
into their computers. The one statistically significant difference between
drive labels can be found between drives that contained a return label and
confidential, exams, and keys drives. The return label-none comparison is
not statistically significant (p = 0.101), but is close to significance at the 0.1
level. We suspect that this difference is because participants often opened
files on the flash drives in order to locate their owners, a hypothesis that is
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supported in our analysis of the survey responses and our discussions with
people who returned the drives to us. The presence of a return label with an
email address allowed participants to contact the owner without needing to
plug the flash drive in and open any files.
Drop Time
As mentioned previously, we dropped drives during two time periods: the
morning (6-10am) and the afternoon (1-5pm). The morning time period was
designed to catch the attention of participants who were going to work or for
lunch, while the afternoon time period was designed to catch the attention of
participants who were leaving work. The difference between the two periods
is shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Opens by time period. While both times of day appear to be
effective, the morning appears to be slightly more so.
Time Period Dropped Opened Fraction Opened
Afternoon 148 64 0.43
Morning 149 71 0.48
These two groups are not statistically significantly different (test of equal
proportions, p = 0.518). We believe that this difference does not exist be-
cause our analysis of checking the drives suggests that people pick up drives
relatively quickly when they see them.
Drop Day
We dropped the majority of the flash drives on Monday and Tuesday. We
exclude 48 drives (corresponding to six different locations) from this analysis;
these drives were deferred until Wednesday because the researchers were
unable to place the drives during the desired time intervals on previous days.
In this section, we analyze the proportion of opens based on the originally
scheduled drop day. Due to an error in the experimental setup, keys and
unlabeled drives were dropped on Monday, while confidential and return
label drives were dropped on Tuesday; originally, all types of drives were to
be dropped on each day. Exam-labeled drives were dropped on both days.
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Out of 125 drives dropped on Monday, 67 were opened for an open fraction
of 0.54. Out of 124 drives dropped on Tuesday, 51 were opened for an open
fraction of 0.41. There is a statistically significant difference between the
two groups of flash drives (test of equal proportions, p = 0.065) at the 0.1
level. However, if we remove the return label drives from the data set, the
two groups are no longer statistically significantly different (test of equal
proportions, p = 0.476). This change suggests that the presence of the return
label drives on Tuesday is primarily responsible for the differences between
drop days.
Location
As mentioned previously in this paper, we divided the flash drives among 30
different locations in 5 different categories. The fraction of drives opened in
each category is shown in Table 3.4, while the fraction of drives opened by
location is shown in Table 3.5. The difference-of-proportions comparisons of
categories can be found in Table 3.6.
Table 3.4: Opens by location category. Parking lots are the most effective
category and academic rooms are the least.
Location Category Total Opened Fraction Opened
Academic Room 58 25 0.43
Common Room 60 26 0.43
Hallway 59 24 0.41
Outside 60 28 0.47
Parking Lot 60 32 0.53
Note that there are no statistically significant differences between location
types when we consider all flash drives. However, parking lots appear to be
the most effective vector, with Lot A3, Lot C9, and Lot F28’s high positions
in the location rankings primarily influencing the result.
We also note a few interesting subgroups and analyze them here.
• 6-Pack Lobby and PAR Main Room are dorms on the University of
Illinois campus. Combined, students opened 16 of the 20 drives dropped
there, for an open fraction of 0.80.
• Grainger Library and UGL are libraries on the University of Illinois
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Table 3.5: Opens by location. Individual location appears to strongly
influence open rate.
Rank Location Total Opened Fraction Opened
1 PAR Main Room 10 9 0.90
2 6-Pack Lobby 10 7 0.70
2 Lot A3 10 7 0.70
2 Lot C9 10 7 0.70
2 Near CSL 10 7 0.70
6 Bardeen Quad 10 6 0.60
6 Lot B21 10 6 0.60
6 Lot F28 10 6 0.60
6 Newmark Civil Engineering Building 10 6 0.60
6 Roger Adams Lab 10 6 0.60
11 Altgeld 10 5 0.50
11 Foellinger Auditorium 10 5 0.50
11 Grainger Library 10 5 0.50
11 Law Building Lecture Hall 10 5 0.50
11 Near ARC 10 5 0.50
11 South Quad 10 5 0.50
11 UGL 10 5 0.50
18 Beckman Cafe 10 3 0.30
18 Engineering Hall 10 3 0.30
18 Grainger Auditorium (ECEB) 10 3 0.30
18 Illini Union Food Court 10 3 0.30
18 Lot D22 10 3 0.30
18 Lot E2 10 3 0.30
18 Main Quad Paths 10 3 0.30
18 MEB/MEL 10 3 0.30
18 Natural Resources Building 10 3 0.30
27 BIF Lecture Hall 8 2 0.25
28 South of Krannert 10 2 0.20
28 Inside CRCE 5 1 0.20
30 David Kinley Hall 9 1 0.11
31 CRCE Lobby 5 0 0.00
Table 3.6: Differences in open fraction by location category. The
ParkingLot/Hallway comparison has the highest magnitude. None of these
differences are significant at the 0.1 level.
AcademicRoom CommonRoom Hallway Outside ParkingLot
AcademicRoom -0.002 (p=1) 0.024 (p=0.937) -0.036 (p=0.838) -0.102 (p=0.354)
CommonRoom 0.027 (p=0.914) -0.033 (p=0.854) -0.1 (p=0.361)
Hallway -0.06 (p=0.636) -0.127 (p=0.23)
Outside -0.067 (p=0.584)
ParkingLot
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campus. Combined, students opened 10 of the 20 drives dropped there,
for an open fraction of 0.50.
• Beckman Cafe and Illini Union Food Court are public eating places on
the University of Illinois campus. Combined, students opened 6 of the
20 drives dropped there, for an open fraction of 0.30.
• Bardeen Quad, Main Quad Paths, and South Quad are centrally lo-
cated quads for the north, main, and south portions of campus, re-
spectively. Combined, students opened 14 out of the 30 drives dropped
there, for an open fraction of 0.47.
• CRCE Lobby and Inside CRCE are the publicly accessible lobby and
card-swipe accessible lobbies for one of the University of Illinois recre-
ation centers. Students only opened 1 of the 10 drives dropped there,
for an open fraction of 0.1.
The dorms are the most interesting of these subgroups due to their sig-
nificant effectiveness. We offer two explanations for this: first, we expect
more students transit through these locations because they are living spaces.
Second, at the University of Illinois, freshmen are required to stay in dorms.
As such, the populations of these areas are likely to trend younger and thus
are likely to be less aware of this sort of attack.
We also briefly mention the ineffectiveness of CRCE Lobby: this lobby is
observed by a front desk that is continually staffed for the times of day that
the experiment ran. We thus suspect that front desk personnel confiscated
our flash drives soon after we dropped them.
Finally, we provide a geographic analysis of this data. When we selected
our 30 locations, we divided them into three groups of using two east-west
streets on the University of Illinois campus. “North” describes the northern-
most, followed by “Main” and then “South.” These divisions are geograph-
ically significant for the University of Illinois because north campus houses
most of the engineering program along with associated research labs; the
main and south campuses host other majors. Open fractions by geographic
region type are shown in Table 3.7 and differences between these groups are
shown in Table 3.8.
Interestingly, the University of Illinois north campus has the highest open
rate, although the differences between it and other campuses are not sta-
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Table 3.7: Opens by location geography. The north quad appears to be the
most effective location.
Campus Total Opened Fraction Opened
main 100 40 0.40
north 100 49 0.49
south 97 46 0.47
Table 3.8: Difference-of-proportions p-values by location geography. None
of these differences were significant at the 0.1 level.
main north south
main -0.09 (p=0.255) -0.074 (p=0.365)
north 0.016 (p=0.937)
south
tistically significant. We posit two explanations for this result: first, the
north campus is more geographically compact. Additionally, two studies in
our related work [34, 38] found that computer expertise was positively corre-
lated with malware compromise. As many engineering buildings are on north
campus and as engineers tend to be more likely to be computer experts, it is
possible that the differences we see here serve as a (weak) proxy for computer
expertise.
3.3.4 Observed Drop Status
Researchers were also instructed to monitor the drive status after the drives
were dropped and report whether the drive had been found, not found, or
moved. In this section, we consider the number of periods before the drive
was taken. Note that we are omitting drives that were marked as “moved”
from this dataset and consider the remaining 284 drives in our analysis. The
dataset was split into 4 groups based on drop time; however, these groups do
not contain the same number of drives with Monday morning and Tuesday
afternoon containing 55 and 58 drives, and Monday afternoon and Tuesday
morning containing 85 and 86 drives. The results are shown in Table 3.9 and
Figure 3.5.
The most noticeable trend in the data is that the majority of drives were
taken within the first period after being dropped. This was largely expected
as traffic during the day period is extremely high and drives were very visible.
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(a) Lag times for Monday
morning drives until they were
picked up.
(b) Lag times for Monday
afternoon drives until they were
picked up.
(c) Lag times for Tuesday
morning drives until they were
picked up.
(d) Lag times for Tuesday
afternoon drives until they were
picked up.
Figure 3.5: Periods before a drive was marked as taken by original drop
time. All drop times show similar distributions.
Furthermore, many drives were expected to be picked up by janitorial staff
during the night period. It is interesting that the drives dropped off during
night periods were almost all picked up within the first period. This most
likely due to the fact that drives that were not picked up by passersby were
picked up by cleaning staff.
Table 3.9: Periods before a drive was marked as taken. Researchers checked
on drives twice a day during normal drop times. The range of hours
corresponding to the possible time difference between the drop and the
taken update is also shown. Drives were picked up quickly.
Number of periods Number of hours Monday Morning Monday Afternoon Tuesday Morning Tuesday Afternoon
1 3-21 43 78 76 57
2 20-28 8 5 7 1
3 27-45 1 0 1 0
4 44-52 1 1 1 0
5 51-69 1 1 0 0
6 68-76 1 0 1 0
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Figure 3.6: Time between drop and first open for all consented drives. This
distribution shows that most drives are opened soon after they are dropped,
although a long tail exists.
3.3.5 Measured Lag Times
As our central server records the timestamps when it receives a message
indicating a drop or a file open, we are also able to provide statistics about
the precise time between when a drive is dropped and opened. However,
we only provide this statistic (abbreviated as lag time for this section) for
participants who consented to provide their data.
Out of the 298 dropped flash drives, 56 people opened a file on the flash
drives and gave us permission to use their data in our study. Two participants
who consented to the use of their data but did not open a file (likely from
opening the HTML file in a virtual machine and then manually following the
consent link) were excluded from this analysis. One drive that was opened
before it was dropped (due to a technical error on the researchers’ part) was
also excluded from the analysis. A histogram of lag times can be found in
Figure 3.6. Thirty-five participants opened the drive within the first 12 hours
of it being dropped; 44 opened a drive within 48 hours.
The median time it took for someone to open a flash drive was 6.933 hours,
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with the average time being 38.480 hours.
Table 3.10 shows the average and median lag times when separated between
the day and time the drive was dropped.
Table 3.10: The average and median time (in hours) between when the
flash drive was dropped and opened, grouped by original drop time.
Mornings showed a smaller median lag than afternoons did.
Day Median Average
Monday Morning 1.812 34.820
Monday Afternoon 7.776 44.45
Tuesday Morning 2.130 50.740
Tuesday Afternoon 8.651 27.446
Lag time demonstrated a long tail, similar to the drop status data.
The mornings tended to have a far smaller lag time than the afternoons.
We suspect that this is because participants who picked up drives in the
mornings were on their way to work or school and were going to use a com-
puter sooner than participants in the afternoon were.
3.3.6 Opened Files
In this section, we briefly analyze the files that were opened by participants
who consented to share their data. Table 3.11 shows which files participants
in the experiment opened first.
Note that unlabeled drives along with drives containing keys and return la-
bels all have similar personal folder contents, consisting of the three top-level
folders “Documents,” “Pictures,” and “Math Notes.” As such, three times as
many drives had this folder structure. Confidential drives contained the “em-
ployee,” “strategy,” and “2015 proj1” folders, while exam drives contained
folders designed to replicate semester numbers.
We notice a few interesting trends in this data. First, the personal file
designed to replicate a resume (“/Documents/resume.pdf.html”) is the most
frequently opened file, with 14 opens. This adds support to the hypothesis
that many participants desired to return the drive to its owner; resumes
often contain contact information. However, the second-most-opened file on
personal drives is a picture file that is the first (in lexicographic order) in the
Pictures folder. As contact information is not frequently found in image files,
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Table 3.11: Files that were opened first by participants in the experiments.
A few files represent the majority of opens.
File Name Frequency
/Documents/resume.pdf.html 14
/Pictures/Winter Break/0101150001.jpg.html 10
/sp15/examA.pdf.html 6
/2015 proj1/feb12proposalA.pptx.html 4
/2015 proj1/patent app 0217.pdf.html 3
/fa10/examA.pdf.html 3
/Documents/reflective essay 02.docx.html 2
/employee/termination notice 4317 05 17 2015.pdf.html 2
/Math Notes/2-13.docx.html 2
/strategy/plan for 2015 2016.pptx.html 2
No file recorded 2
/employee/termination notice 4318 05 17 2015.pdf.html 1
/fa10/solutionsA.pdf.html 1
/fa13/examB.pdf.html 1
/Pictures/Winter Break/1224142256.jpg.html 1
/Pictures/Winter Break/1226141505.jpg.html 1
/Pictures/Winter Break/1231142359.jpg.html 1
/sp10/examA.pdf.html 1
/strategy/0425 meeting notes.pdf.html 1
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we suspect that subjects may have chosen this file out of curiosity. However,
we emphasize that these files were placed in three times as many drives as
the confidential and exam drive files.
For exam drives, the most popular choice is “/sp15/examA.pdf.html”.
This file is the first in a folder that refers to the semester in which the
experiment was conducted; as the experiment occurred during the last reg-
ular week of classes, it is perhaps unsurprising that students looked to see if
current final exams could be found on the drive.
For confidential drives, both of the files in the 2015 proj1 folder are the
most popular. We suspect that this popularity is due to the fact that the
2015 proj1 folder is first in a lexicographic ordering of folder names and be-
cause both files appear to contain information that could identify the owner.
Finally, we note that two drives recorded consent without file opens; this
suggests to us that the HTML files were opened in text editors (or virtual
machines without internet connections) and the link to consent was manually
followed. This result is interesting because it suggests that some users are
indeed practicing increased security hygiene around the files.
In Table 3.12, we show the frequencies of the number of times files were
opened for consenting participants.
Table 3.12: Frequency of the number of file opens. Most people open only
one or two files, although some participants opened many.
Number of Files Opened Frequency
0 2
1 17
2 15
3 7
4 6
5 3
6 3
10 2
11 2
23 1
Note that the majority of participants only opened one or two files. This
is unsurprising, as the purpose of the experiment is made clear with the
first file open and all files have (visibly) identical contents. We suspect that
additional file opens beyond the first were primarily motivated by curiosity
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about the other contents of the drive by participants, although we did detect
one case of abuse where participants were repeatedly filling out surveys for
additional compensation.
3.3.7 Operating System
In this section, we analyze aggregate data about the operating system (pulled
from the user agent string that was sent to our central server upon file open)
of the computers on which files were opened. Table 3.13 shows the total num-
ber of drives opened by operating system. Note that some user-agent strings
contained incomplete data, giving results such as “Windows” or “Linux”
rather than a specific version. We provide the data in this form, and suggest
specific versions that these are likely to correspond to.
Table 3.13: Number of file opens by operating system. Windows 7 was the
most prevalent operating system.
Operating System Number of Opens Proportion of Opens
Windows 7 32 0.55
Mac OS X 16 0.28
Windows 4 0.07
Linux 3 0.05
None 2 0.03
Ubuntu 1 0.02
Aggregate data pulled from W3Counter [55] suggests that the Windows
category could likely be either Windows 8, or Windows XP.
Aggregates by type of operating system are shown in Table 3.14.
Table 3.14: Number of file opens by operating system family. Windows
machines were the most prevalent.
Operating System Family Number of Opens Proportion of Opens
Linux 4 0.07
Mac 16 0.28
Windows 36 0.63
None 2 0.03
For comparison, data about the total population of operating systems
(pulled from user-agent strings, again from W3Counter) are shown in Ta-
ble 3.15. Note that we normalize this data by removing Android and iOS
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use percentages from the calculation (24.04% in aggregate) and re-calculate
proportions; we do so because most Android and all iOS devices lack full-
sized USB ports to plug flash drives into and thus are not representative of
computers that were used in our study.
Table 3.15: Proportion of operating systems in the general web-browsing
population.
Operating System Family Proportion of Opens
Linux .03
Mac .08
Windows .79
The proportion of Mac users in this experiment is significantly (Fisher’s
exact test, p = 3.128 · 10−5) greater than the proportion of Mac users seen
in the W3Counter data, and the proportion of Windows users (Fisher’s ex-
act test, p = 0.0046) is significantly lower in our data set. To apply Fisher’s
exact test, we multiplied the proportion by 1000 and used this number in cal-
culations (i.e., Linux was represented as the proportion 33 out of 1000). We
speculate that this could be due to demographic purchasing habits; college
students may own more Macs than the general population.
3.3.8 Browser
In this section, we analyze the reported browser for each opened (consented)
flash drive. Note that “Other” refers to an unknown browser in our user-
agent parser, rather than a browser that does not fit into the above categories.
The number of flash drive opens by browser are shown in Table 3.16.
Table 3.16: Number and proportion of opens by browser. Note the large
number of opens by the ‘Other’ browser.
Browser Number of Opens Proportion of Opens
Chrome 26 0.45
Firefox 12 0.21
IE 8 0.14
Other 6 0.10
Safari 4 0.07
None 2 0.03
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For comparison, general-population browsing data from W3Counter is
shown in Table 3.17.
Table 3.17: Proportion of web browsers in the general web-browsing
population.
Browser Proportion of Opens
Chrome 0.43
Firefox 0.15
IE 0.17
Safari 0.15
Opera 0.03
None of these browser proportions differ significantly between our data and
the W3 data, although Opera is not explicitly found in our data. However,
the Other browser user-agent that we collected could belong to any real
browser; as such, this comparison is limited in strength.
3.3.9 Summary
In summary, we find that the time and date at which flash drives were
dropped, as well as the category of the drop location or its placement on
campus do not significantly impact open rates. However, flash drives that do
not contain return labels tend to be significantly more effective than those
that do. Individual locations show a significant amount of variation in ef-
fectiveness. Most drives are picked up quickly, and individuals tended to
gravitate to a few different files on the drives. Participants’ computers tend
to be Macs significantly more frequently than the general population, but
their web browser usage is not significantly different than the general popu-
lation.
Overall, our total open rate (135/297, or 45.45%) is less than the experi-
ments run by Stasiukonis [11] (15/20 = 75%), Wright [12] (32/54 = 59.26%),
and McQueen [13] (34/50 = 68%). However, this attack was more effective
than the one described in Jacobs [14] (22/60 = 36.66%). Applying the test
for equality of proportions, our open rate is significantly less than Stasiuko-
nis’s (p = 0.020), Wright’s (p = 0.085), and McQueen’s (p = 0.005), but
not significantly more than Jacobs’ (p = 0.268). We posit that our attacks
were less effective than those in other studies because we targeted a larger
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population in more locations; as a result, we chose some locations that were
ineffective, reducing our average open rate.
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CHAPTER 4
USB SURVEY
In this chapter, we present the methodology and results of the survey that
was offered to participants who picked up a flash drive and inserted it into a
computer. We also discuss reactions to the experiment from social media and
provide analysis about USB flash drives that were returned to the research
team. The matter in this chapter is designed to provide an answer to our
second research question:
• Why do people pick up the flash drives?
4.1 Survey Methodology
4.1.1 USB Survey
In this survey, participants were asked questions from the SeBIS [8] and the
risk taking version of the 30-question DOSPERT [9], as well as demographic
questions about their sex, age, highest level of education and employment
status. All of the demographic questions were sourced from SurveyMonkey’s
question bank feature, which provides methodologically sound wording and
answer choices [56]. Participants were also asked to indicate their affiliation
with the University of Illinois and whether they had heard any information
about the study before they had picked up a drive; the latter question was
used to filter out data from participants who knew that the experiment was
occurring from the analysis. Participants were then asked open-ended ques-
tions about how the appearance of the drive influenced them to pick it up,
as well as why the users ultimately picked up the drives and clicked on files.
We also asked participants how much time they spent on the Internet in a
week because other studies (such as [32]) tested to see if this was a factor
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that predicted malware compromise. We also include the computer exper-
tise question from Le´vesque et al.’s study [34] because computer expertise
was found to correlate with compromise in that study. Finally, to track
whether participants were paying attention to the survey, we added six at-
tention check questions to the SeBIS and DOSPERT scales; these questions
instructed participants to choose a particular answer (e.g., “Please choose
often for this item to show you are paying attention.”).
The instrument given to participants can be found in Appendix A.
Data for this survey was collected anonymously via the SurveyMonkey
online platform [57]. Participants had the option of providing their email
addresses if they wished to receive an Amazon electronic gift card or meeting
the researchers at a fixed location at a fixed time to receive cash compensa-
tion.
4.1.2 Amazon Mechanical Turk Survey
In order to determine whether participants who picked up the flash drives
had risk attitudes that varied significantly from the general population, we
first wanted to measure the risk attitudes of the general population using an
online survey.
This survey was identical to the USB survey, except that the USB-related
questions were replaced with questions that asked participants if they had
experienced each of five forms of technology-related compromise within the
past two years. These forms (e-mail or social networking compromise, mal-
ware infection, data loss, data theft, and unauthorized credit card purchases)
were chosen to represent a varied subset of cybercrime victimization.
However, we did not have time to perform this experiment by the time
of this publication. Instead, we use Blais and Weber’s [9] and Egelman and
Peer’s [8] work as baselines to compare against in our analysis in Section
4.2.
4.2 Survey Results
In this section, we discuss the results of the survey that was administered to
participants who picked up and plugged in the flash drives.
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We received 80 survey responses. After discarding 7 incomplete responses,
1 response in which the participant self-identified as under 18 years of age,
and 1 response in which the participant self-identified as knowing about the
study, we see 71 responses. We explicitly note that this number is larger
than the 58 flash drives in the experiment associated with explicit participant
consent.
To check to see whether this difference was due to intentional action on
participants’ behalf, we analyzed the timestamps created when a file was
opened on a drive and when a survey was started in SurveyMonkey. We
associated a survey with a particular flash drive if we recorded a flash drive
open between zero and five minutes before the survey was started. When we
performed this association, we found that 11 survey responses were associ-
ated with a single flash drive; we suspect that this was an attempt to earn
additional compensation using the flash drive. To correct for this pattern, we
included the first response associated with the drive and removed the other
10 responses from our dataset.
As two responses out of the original 80 were removed due to prior ex-
perience and age considerations, and as two drives were associated with no
opened files, our difference then becomes potentially as large as 71 - 10 - 58
+ 2 + 2 = 7 responses. However, we believe that this worst-case margin
of error is acceptable given the possibility that multiple participants could
have recorded their experiences with a single flash drive in other cases. As
such, we analyzed 61 survey responses for the demographic portions of the
analysis. In the case of the DOSPERT and SEBIS data, we also removed
participants who answered “prefer not to answer” on any question on the
relevant scale. This reduced our sample size to 56 for the DOSPERT and 58
for the SeBIS.
While 3 respondents failed 1 out of 6 attention-check questions, our IRB
did not specify attention-check questions as exclusion criteria for this data
and we do not feel that these failures are significant.
4.2.1 Open-Ended Questions
In this section, we discuss trends that we found in open-ended responses to
survey data.
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We note the following trends:
• Participants underestimate the threat of infected websites.
Multiple participants indicated that they perceived clicking on the files
as relatively safe because the files had the HTML extension. To quote
one participant, when asked whether they had any concerns about
opening the file on the flash drive: “At first I did, however after seeing
how the flash drive had only files on it which were directing to a website
(.html link)I wasn’t as worried as I have Antivirus and spyware soft-
ware installed on my computer.” This suggests that participants are
less aware of possible web-based threats than malicious executables.
• Participants view shared resources as a proxy for safe com-
puting. Multiple participants indicated that they opened the flash
drive on a university shared machine instead of their own machine to
mitigate the risk of causing problems for their own computers. Upon
being asked whether they had any concerns about plugging in the flash
drive, one respondent answered: “I would have, so I sacrificed a univer-
sity computer.” This finding seems to suggest that participants view
computers they may not own or administer as devices that can be used
to test unknown objects.
• Some participants have strong security hygiene. A small number
of respondents indicated that they took significant protective measures.
Some opened the HTML file using a text editor, and others attached
the flash drives to machines that did not have internet access. This
is an encouraging result, as this sort of response is an effective way to
deal with this sort of threat.
• Users generally trust security software to protect their com-
puters. A few respondents indicated that they did not worry about
the risk of malware infection because of the software setup of their ma-
chines. This occasionally extended to operating systems as well: “I
trust my Macbook to be a good defense against viruses.”
• Curiosity and desire to return the flash drive dominate moti-
vations. The majority of participants indicated that they investigated
the flash drive to return it to its proper owner and were searching for
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Table 4.1: Survey respondents by sex. They do not differ as a whole from
the Illinois student population.
Sex Frequency Fraction p
Male 35 0.65 0.21
Female 18 0.33 0.13
Prefer not to answer 1 0.02
contact information on the drive. Many participants highlighted the
presence of keys as a factor that helped them to pick up the drive: “It
placed more urgency to return it to its owner. Someone could be locked
out of their apartment/house or something, so I would rather return
it faster.” A smaller fraction indicated that they wished to view the
contents of the drive. This curiosity appears to dominate over suspi-
cion at times; multiple participants indicated that they believed the
drives labeled “Final Exam Solutions” and “Confidential” were inten-
tionally dropped (e.g., “At no point did I consider that it was a USB
of test questions... either way, I have to know what is on it.”), but
were still willing to investigate. More concerningly, this extended to
opening a file on the drive: “I was wondering why a jpeg picture had
an html address.” Two participants also admitted to picking up the
drives because they needed another flash drive for storing assignments.
4.2.2 Demographics
In this section, we analyze the responses to demographic questions posed in
the survey.
Sex
Table 4.1 shows the proportion of participants by self-identified sex. We
excluded 7 staff members from this analysis.
This does not statistically significantly differ from the University of Illi-
nois’s student population, which has 24163 men, 19436 women, and 3 un-
known persons for a total of 43603 students [58] (test of equality of propor-
tions, p = 0.21 for men and p = 0.13 for women).
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Table 4.2: Survey respondents by age. The significant majority of students
were of either underclassman undergraduate age (18-20) or in their twenties.
AgeGroup Frequency Fraction p
18-20 19 0.35 0.76
21-29 32 0.59 0.63
30-39 1 0.02 0.37
40 or older 2 0.04 0.12
Prefer not to answer 0 0.00
Age
Table 4.2 shows the proportion of participants by age. We removed seven
participants (two in the 21-29 range, three in the 30-39 range, and two in the
40-49 range) who self-identified as staff.
Note that most participants reported as either 18-20 or 21-29. As typical
undergraduates in the United States range from 18-23 in age and many grad-
uate students are in their 20s, this result makes sense given the affiliation
data in Section 4.2.2.
We also compare these fractions with those found in the University of
Illinois’s demographic data [58]. As this data provides year of birth, we
estimate that birthdays are evenly distributed across days. As May 1 is
approximately 1/3 into the year, we assign 1/3 of birthdays to one age and
2/3 to the next (e.g., 1/3 of the people born in 1992 are 23 and the rest are
22). Using this estimate, we find that 16623/43603 (38.1%) students are in
the 18-20 age group, 24025 (55.1%) students are in the 21-29 age group, 2402
(5.5% students are in the 30-39 age group, and 473 (1.1%) are 40 or older.
Applying the test for equal proportions to this data, we find that the fraction
of 18-20 year olds does not significantly differ (p = 0.76) and the fraction of
21-29 year olds does not significantly differ (p = 0.63) between the University
population and participants in our study. Using Fisher’s exact test, we find
that the fraction of 30-39 year olds does not significantly differ between these
populations (p = 0.37), as well as the fraction of participants over 40 (p =
0.12).
We believe that our sample is mostly representative of the University of
Illinois’s student population at large.
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Table 4.3: Survey respondents by affiliation to the University of Illinois.
Few faculty and staff participated in the study.
Affiliation Frequency Fraction p
Faculty 0 0.00 0.08
Staff 7 0.11 0.53
Graduate Student 13 0.21 0.94
Undergraduate Student 40 0.66 0.39
None 0 0.00
Prefer not to answer 1 0.02
Table 4.4: Affiliation populations at the University of Illinois.
Affiliation Frequency Fraction
Faculty 2974 0.0542
Staff 8314 0.1515
Graduate Student 11024 0.2008
Undergraduate Student 32579 0.5935
Affiliation
The affiliations of participants to the University of Illinois are shown in Table
4.3.
Most participants were undergraduate students and no participants self-
reported as faculty. This data matches the age findings, which suggest that
survey participants tended to be young and relatively inexperienced in their
studies.
For faculty and staff numbers for comparison purposes, we refer to the
University of Illinois’s facts page [59]. The numbers for undergraduate en-
rollment (32,579) and graduate enrollment (11,024) match the ones given in
our other source [58]. As there are 2,974 faculty at the University of Illinois
as well as 8,314 staff, our entire population is 54,891. We show these numbers
in Table 4.4.
Applying the test for equal proportions, we find that the proportions of
undergraduate students (p = 0.39), graduate students (p = 0.94) and staff
(p = 0.53) do not significantly differ from the general campus population.
Applying Fisher’s exact test, we find that significantly fewer faculty (p =
0.08) were found in our sample. However, we do note that one participant
declined to provide their affiliation.
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Table 4.5: Survey respondents by internet usage. Participants spent
varying amounts of time on the internet.
Time on Internet Frequency Fraction
Less than 10 hours 3 0.05
More than 10 but less than 30 hours 21 0.34
More than 30 but less than 50 hours 27 0.44
More than 50 but less than 80 hours 7 0.11
More than 80 hours 3 0.05
Prefer not to answer 0 0.00
Internet Usage
We asked participants to estimate the amount of time they spent on the
internet in a week. This question was included in our survey because other
studies (such as Bossler and Holt [32] and Le´vesque et al. [34]) include it as a
potential predictor using the argument that more internet exposure increased
a subject’s potential for victimization. The results are shown in Table 4.5.
Participants were approximately equally divided between occasional (10-
30 hours a week) and frequent (30-50 hours a week) groups. We are unsure
whether both of these groups were popular due to question phrasing, a dif-
ference in work habits (such as major), or some other reason. However, it
is interesting to note that participants belonged to every possible category,
which suggests that this attack works across a broad cross section of internet
users.
We do not provide any comparisons to other work in this section because
other literature used different question phrasing and did not report statistics
about the answer to questions of this form.
Computer Expertise
In order to estimate participants’ computer expertise, we asked them a ques-
tion originally posed in Le´vesque et al.’s study [34]. Participants were asked
to indicate which (if any) of three computing activities they had previously
completed. The responses for this question are shown in Table 4.6 and Table
4.7.
Many participants had participated in multiple computer expertise-related
activities. The majority of participants had installed or re-installed an op-
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Table 4.6: Survey respondents by computer expertise activity. The
majority of participants had participated in operating system installation
at some point, and network configuration and web page development were
also relatively popular.
Activity Frequency Fraction
I have installed or re-installed an operating system on a computer 40 0.66
I have configured a home network 27 0.44
I have created a web page 28 0.46
None of the above 15 0.25
Prefer not to answer 0 0.00
Table 4.7: Survey respondents by number of computer expertise activities
performed. About a third of participants could be classified as computer
experts in this study.
Number of Activities Performed Frequency Fraction
0 15 0.25
1 15 0.25
2 13 0.21
3 18 0.30
erating system at some point in time, and over 40% of participants had
completed the other two specified activities.
Approximately 30% of participants completed all three activities, which
would define them as experts as described in Le´vesque et al. [34]. This ratio
is not significantly different than the 18% of participants who were experts
given in Le´vesque et al. [34]. (Test for equal proportions, p = 0.24.)
4.2.3 DOSPERT
In this section, we analyze participant responses to the risk taking scale of
the 30-question DOSPERT; this scale is described in further detail in Blais
and Weber [9].
Table 4.8 describes the mean, standard deviation, and Cronbach’s alpha
[60], which is a measure of a scale’s reliability, for each domain in both Blais
and Weber’s paper [9] (for the given English-speaking population) and our
study. Data from Blais and Weber [9] is given the subscript “paper,” while
our data is given the subscript “study.’ We also report the results of Welch’s
two-sample unpaired t-test between each domain in [9] and our paper (e.g.,
the comparison between the Ethical domain in [9] and the results for our
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ethical domain).
Table 4.8: Mean, standard deviation, Cronbach’s alpha, and t-test results
between domains for the DOSPERT in both Blais and Weber’s paper [9]
and our study. Participants in our study reported less willingness to try
risky activities in all domains except recreational risk.
Domain Mpaper SDpaper αpaper Mstudy SDstudy αstudy t df p
Ethical 17.97 7.16 0.75 12.59 4.68 0.52 6.48 143.96 1.34E-09
Financial 20.67 8.51 0.83 15.27 5.26 0.67 5.65 153.11 7.62E-08
Health/Safety 21.80 7.84 0.71 19.18 7.06 0.65 2.35 102.66 2.09E-02
Recreational 23.01 9.40 0.86 25.46 10.13 0.87 -1.60 87.91 1.13E-01
Social 32.42 6.44 0.79 29.75 5.67 0.54 2.96 105.00 3.82E-03
It is interesting to note that participants in this study reported significantly
smaller scores on all DOSPERT domains except the Recreational domain
versus Blais and Weber [9]; this suggests that they are less willing to try
risky activities. However, it is important to note that the context of the
experiment may have primed participants to be more risk-averse; participants
were directed to this survey after they had picked up a flash drive, plugged
it in, and been notified that their behavior constitutes a security risk.
4.2.4 SeBIS
In this section, we present participants’ responses to the Security Behavior
Intentions Scale (SeBIS); this scale is described in further detail in [8].
Table 4.9 describes the mean, standard deviation, and Cronbach’s alpha for
each of the items in the SeBIS in both Egelman and Peer [8] and our study.
We also report the results of Welch’s two-sample unpaired t-test between
each item in Egelman and Peer [8] and our paper. Table 4.10 describes the
mean and standard deviation for each of the subscales in the SeBIS for our
study, as well as Cronbach’s alpha for both our study and Egelman and Peer
[8].
First, we note that Cronbach’s alpha for each subscale, shown in Table
4.10, is relatively similar. The main difference in Cronbach’s alpha can be
found in password generation, which is less in our study.
While many of the item responses in our study have significantly different
means than Egelman and Peer’s, we choose to focus on the responses that
display the greatest differences and comment on their implications. These
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Table 4.9: Information about responses to items in the SeBIS in both
Egelman and Peer’s study [8] and our own. The response items for this scale
were {Never (1), Rarely (2), Sometimes (3), Often (4), Always (5)}. We
recoded reverse-scored items (indicated by the r superscript), as in Egelman
and Peer’s paper. Our averages differ in the case of many questions.
Question Mpaper SDpaper Mstudy SDstudy t df p
I set my computer screen to automatically
lock if I don’t use it for a prolonged period
of time.
3.20 1.56 3.93 1.43 -3.66 73.77 4.69E-04
I use a password/passcode to unlock my lap-
top or tablet.
3.78 1.52 4.17 1.43 -1.97 72.93 5.31E-02
I manually lock my computer screen when I
step away from it.
2.63 1.34 3.31 1.52 -3.26 67.67 1.77E-03
I use a PIN or passcode to unlock my mobile
phone.
3.21 1.73 3.72 1.68 -2.19 71.75 3.14E-02
I do not change my passwords, unless I have
to.
2.65 1.09 1.90 1.00 5.36 73.55 9.07E-07
I use different passwords for different ac-
counts that I have.
3.75 1.04 3.17 1.16 3.64 68.05 5.32E-04
When I create a new online account, I try to
use a password that goes beyond the site’s
minimum requirements.
3.31 1.10 3.41 1.20 -0.63 68.49 5.31E-01
I do not include special characters in my
password if it’s not required.
3.30 1.29 2.81 1.46 2.45 67.82 1.68E-02
When someone sends me a link, I open it
without first verifying where it goes.
4.01 1.01 2.97 1.21 6.30 66.56 2.66E-08
I know what website I’m visiting based on its
look and feel, rather than by looking at the
URL bar.
3.17 1.08 3.03 1.01 0.96 72.95 3.39E-01
I submit information to websites without
first verifying that it will be sent securely
(e.g., SSL, https://, a lock icon).
3.69 1.10 3.29 1.16 2.49 69.59 1.52E-02
When browsing websites, I mouseover links
to see where they go, before clicking them.
3.69 1.03 3.26 1.37 2.32 64.63 2.34E-02
If I discover a security problem, I continue
what I was doing because I assume someone
else will fix it.
4.08 0.98 3.71 1.12 2.42 67.35 1.80E-02
When I’m prompted about a software up-
date, I install it right away.
3.07 1.03 2.81 1.02 1.84 71.41 7.03E-02
I try to make sure that the programs I use
are up-to-date.
3.78 0.89 3.50 0.92 2.20 69.88 3.14E-02
I verify that my anti-virus software has been
regularly updating itself.
3.55 1.23 3.33 1.37 1.18 68.07 2.41E-01
Table 4.10: Subscale means and standard deviations in our study, along
with Cronbach’s alpha for both studies. All subscale reliabilities except the
Password Generation subscale appear to be similar to Egelman and Peer’s
work [8], confirming that their scale is generally reliable.
Subscale Mstudy SDstudy αstudy αpaper
All 52.14 10.34 0.803 0.801
Device Securement 15.04 4.60 0.728 0.764
Password Generation 11.36 3.17 0.503 0.728
Proactive Awareness 16.14 3.92 0.694 0.668
Updating 9.61 2.42 0.554 0.719
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differences are unsurprising, as Egelman and Peer’s work deals with an Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk sample, while our work deals with a sample of university
students and other people affiliated with the university.
Participants guarded their computers more closely. Participants
reported they were significantly more likely to manually lock their computers
or set their computers to automatically lock when leaving their computers.
Participants trust links more. They were significantly more likely to
indicate that they would open a link without first verifying where the link
went.
Participants used weaker passwords. They were significantly more
likely to reuse passwords and significantly more likely to avoid changing their
passwords.
In summary, it appears that participants appear to be more concerned
with the physical safety of their computers rather than the strength of their
passwords or the validity of the links they follow. In the context of this study,
this difference is particularly ironic.
4.3 Reactions to the Experiment
In this section, we examine the public reaction to this study.
The debriefing page found in the HTML files on the flash drives contained
contact information for one of the researchers. As a result, we were contacted
by various departments who wanted to return the devices. We collected 54
drives; one drive had all of its data formatted, so we could not match it to
an existing record and removed it from our analysis.
4.3.1 Returned Drives by Category
Flash Drive Label
While all flash drive labels experienced some degree of success in convincing
participants to pick them up and plug them into their computers, it is also
relevant to note how the flash drive labels influenced participants to return
or attempt to return the drives.
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Table 4.11: Returned drives by flash drive label. Drives that contained keys
(Keys and Return Label drives) were returned more frequently.
Label Dropped Opened Returned Fraction Opened Fraction Returned
Keys 60 29 17 0.48 0.28
Return Label 59 14 11 0.24 0.19
Exams 60 29 11 0.48 0.18
Confidential 58 29 8 0.50 0.14
None 60 27 6 0.45 0.10
From Table 4.11, we see that the keys served as the label with the highest
return fraction of 0.28. A likely explanation for this is that keys are viewed
as an essential item that many people rely on a daily basis. Since keys are
viewed by many as a universally dependent item, the sight of dropped keys
may invoke an additional degree of empathy in the participant that the other
labels cannot.
Additionally, we can see that for drives with a return, exams, and con-
fidential label, the return fractions were 0.19, 0.18, and 0.14 respectively.
Although these return fractions are lower than for the keys, the close range
may be explained with similar rationale. The return, exams, and confidential
label may be perceived as more valuable to the participant, and therefore it
may be worth the altruistic effort required to attempt to return the drive.
The assessment that the perceived value of the label increases the chance
of the drive being returned may be further explained by the lower return
fraction of .10 for the drives without any label. The lack of the label may
make the drive appear like a generic lost flash drive; without any additional
perceivable value, the flash drive alone may not be enough to motivate the
participant to make an effort to return the drive.
Return Location
Drives that were returned to the same location in which they were scheduled
to be dropped are shown in Table 4.12.
We note that certain locations are very effective at returning drives; we
hypothesize that this is a per-building policy.
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Table 4.12: Returned drives by location. The top four return locations
returned the majority of the drives.
Location Total Opened Returned Fraction Opened Fraction Returned
David Kinley Hall 9 1 7 0.11 0.78
Newmark Civil Engineering Building 10 6 7 0.60 0.70
Grainger Library 10 5 6 0.50 0.60
Natural Resources Building 10 3 6 0.30 0.60
MEB/MEL 10 3 5 0.30 0.50
Altgeld 10 5 4 0.50 0.40
Bardeen Quad 10 5 4 0.50 0.40
Lot A3 10 7 3 0.70 0.30
Grainger Auditorium (ECEB) 10 3 3 0.30 0.30
CRCE Lobby 5 0 1 0.00 0.20
Near CSL 10 7 2 0.70 0.20
Foellinger Auditorium 10 3 1 0.30 0.10
Lot E2 10 2 1 0.20 0.10
Main Quad Paths 10 3 1 0.30 0.10
Table 4.13: Returned drives that were returned to different locations. Half
of the returned drives (28/56) were returned in a different location than
they were dropped.
Schedule Location Return Location Frequency
Grainger Auditorium (ECEB) Engineering IT-North Campus 3
Grainger Library Engineering IT-South Campus 3
MEB/MEL Engineering IT-North Campus 3
Grainger Library University Libraries 2
Lot A3 Talbot 2
Bardeen Quad Engineering IT-South Campus 1
Bardeen Quad Talbot 1
Bardeen Quad University Libraries 1
Bardeen Quad Unknown 1
CRCE Lobby Altgeld 1
Foellinger Auditorium Altgeld 1
Grainger Library Unknown 1
Lot A3 University Libraries 1
Lot E2 Temple Hoyne Buell Hall 1
Main Quad Paths CSL 1
MEB/MEL Unknown 1
Near CSL CSL 1
Near CSL Engineering IT-North Campus 1
South Quad Mumford Hall 1
South Quad Temple Hoyne Buell Hall 1
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Different Return Location
Table 4.13 describes location pairs when the return location is different than
the scheduled location. It appears that some buildings forward their drives
onto different lost and founds, while drives dropped on certain other outside
paths are distributed into nearby buildings.
Return Contact
Table 4.14 describes the categories of people who returned the flash drives.
Table 4.14: Returned drives by return contact. Most drives were returned
by administrators.
Contact Returned
Admin 32
Facilities 1
Grad Student 0
IT 18
Professor 1
Student 1
The majority of these contacts were driven by administrative personnel; in
discussions with these participants, we learned that many of them served (of-
ficially or unofficially) as the contact person for lost items in their individual
departments.
4.3.2 E-Mail Contacts
Drives that had return labels attached to them also contained contact in-
formation for a fictitious individual. We created 10 such profiles; 5 of the
profiles contained male names and 5 of the profiles contained female names.
Each name was chosen at random using one of the top 100 most popular first
names in the state of Illinois in 1993 and one of the top 100 most popular
last names in the United States in the 2000 census [61, 62]. Each person was
also given a gmail account of the form “first.last.NNNN@gmail.com”, where
NNNN represents a four-digit random number selected by the researchers.
Only the name and email address were written on the return tag. As we had
76
10 e-mail accounts and 60 different return label USB keys, we attached each
name to 6 different tags.
The number of responses to each fake contact are shown in Table 4.15.
Table 4.15: Emails sent to return return label flash drives after a week in
the experiment. All emails were contacted by at least three separate people.
Name Email Number of Emails Received Number of Unique Senders
Trevor Mitchell trevor.mitchell.5427@gmail.com 7 6
Jared Hill jared.hill.7589@gmail.com 5 5
Keith Reed keith.reed.1010@gmail.com 4 4
Jose Gutierrez jose.gutierrez.4501@gmail.com 5 4
Antonio Diaz antonio.diaz.4365@gmail.com 3 3
Katherine Hall katherine.hall.3293@gmail.com 8 6
Brooke Green brooke.green.1290@gmail.com 4 4
Crystal Roberts crystal.roberts.2221@gmail.com 3 3
Alexis Peterson alexis.peterson.5150@gmail.com 6 6
Emma Cruz emma.cruz.7842@gmail.com 3 3
On average, each recipient had received 4.8 emails from 4.4 different email
addresses by one week after the start of the experiment. This average holds
for both male and female names, as both the male and female names received
a total of 24 different emails from 22 different email addresses. As we only
dropped 6 different flash drives with each email address, we consider this
result especially encouraging.
4.3.3 Social Media Response
During the experiment, we monitored a few social media sites for descrip-
tions of the experiment. We include this information as an anecdotal proxy
for how fast information spread during the duration of the study. The Uni-
versity of Illinois has a sub-forum on the popular user-submitted content site
Reddit, entitled r/uiuc. r/uiuc is not university-affiliated; it has 10,565 sub-
scribers and describes events in the university and the cities of Urbana and
Champaign. We also monitored the “Free and For Sale” Facebook group for
the University of Illinois; this group is also not affiliated with the university
and has 10,721 members. Both of these pages are open (i.e., they do not
require approval to join). None of the members of the research team posted
on either page on posts relating to the study.
On Tuesday, April 28, at 10:52 AM, a student posted a picture of one of
the devices with keys in Free and For Sale and identified that the drive was
found outside the civil engineering building. We also realized that the same
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individual posted in an open group for the Civil Engineering department on
the same day at 12:27 AM, indicating that the flash drive in question had
been retrieved at some point on Monday.
By Tuesday, April 28, at 1:03 PM, a user on r/uiuc posted after finding
drives of various types in multiple locations. The user indicated that they
had reported the issue to campus IT and believed that the drives could be
part of a research study. Commenters primarily confirmed the presence (and
non-maliciousness) of the flash drives and speculated about the purpose of
the study. Two users warned readers to avoid plugging the devices into their
computers.
By Thursday, April 30, at 10:17 AM, one of the researchers’ Facebook
friends posted a status indicating that they had noticed multiple USB drives
labeled “Confidential” being deliberately left in the building.
By Thursday, April 30, at 4:03 PM, another user (who identified as working
for campus IT) posted about flash drives labelled “Final Exam Answers.”
The author referenced the previous post and encouraged readers not to plug
the drives in. Commenters referenced the previous thread, speculated about
the purpose of the experiment, and discussed the deletion of the previous
post.
Given this evidence, we highlight the following trends in public social media
perception of the experiment:
1. Information spreads using multiple avenues. While there was
relatively little public discussion of the experiment in either reddit post
(9 comments in the first and 17 in the second), posters indicated that
they had discussed their findings with others and were aware that the
drives could be part of an experiment.
2. The density of the experiment may have been too high. The
creator of the first reddit post indicated that they had found multiple
drives in various locations over the course of Monday and Tuesday.
While the research team had hoped to reduce the density of the drives
to the point where a student would not encounter multiple drives during
the course of the experiment, this goal appears to have been missed to
a degree.
3. There may still be a significant lag before drives are identified
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as suspicious. All social media posts that we were able to identify
as related to the experiment were found on Tuesday; while the cam-
pus population may have been growing increasingly suspicious of the
drives before this period, they did not publicly communicate until then.
This trend seems to indicate that a motivated attacker may be able to
successfully accomplish their objective before a coordinated defense is
mounted by the community.
4.3.4 Altruistic Experiences
Twice during the experiment, researchers were given back flash drives that
they attempted to drop. The subjects who returned the drives were non-
confrontational; we consider these incidents an effective display of altruism
that underscores the conclusions of this thesis.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
5.1 Discussion
This section discusses trends we have noticed in this thesis.
This attack is effective by default. By placing flash drives in locations
that are in plain sight, researchers were able to successfully achieve a 45.45%
pickup rate. Also, please note that this attack rate is conservative; we only
tracked when a participant plugged in a drive and opened a file. Given the
fact that all of the drives had disappeared within 3 days of dropping, we
believe that some fraction of the remaining population plugged in drives but
did not click on files. In practice, this means that the vulnerability rate for
the population is even higher.
While we did not find any particular choice of experimental parameters
that was significantly superior to all others, we suggest that the following
parameters may affect experimental success:
• Uniqueness is key. Participants in this experiment began to get
suspicious when they noticed multiple flash drives with identical ap-
pearances around campus. An “effective” attack in more realistic cir-
cumstances involves the victims being unaware that they are being
compromised. As our data suggests that the appearance of the flash
drive does not significantly impact pickup rates (provided that it does
not have a return label), we believe that randomizing the appearances
of drives would help to avoid general detection.
• Both attacks and detection can be quick, but coordinated re-
sponse can be delayed. Most activations occurred within a day of
the drop; however, discussions with staff who returned drives suggested
that the drives were brought to their attention within a short time as
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well. While individual departments may have been made aware of the
incident rather quickly, coordinated responses (by both students and
IT staff) to address the drives took approximately a day to material-
ize. This suggests that a window of opportunity exists for an attacker
to compromise an organization before a coordinated response to the
threat is mounted. However, we suspect that corporate environments
(with centralized IT departments and better-trained users) would be
able to handle this attack more quickly than universities (with less
centralization and less-experienced users).
• Proper location selection is key. Location was the one parameter
that appeared to vary the most in effectiveness within the experimental
design. While our sample size for each location is not large enough to
make significant conclusions about the data set, it seems to be the
case that a properly chosen location can make the difference in the
effectiveness of an attack. We also note that one report to engineering
IT staff was made from the department level; a poorly chosen target
can raise an alarm about the attack.
• Participants appear to be generally motivated by altruism and
curiosity. Participants returned 54 drives (that the research team
is aware of) to administrative staff and IT security personnel. They
tended to open files that could be expected to contain contact infor-
mation (“resume.pdf.html”), and typically emailed the owners of flash
drives without snooping whenever possible. In our survey, they typi-
cally expressed a desire to return the flash drives to their proper owners.
However, some fraction of participants expressed in the survey that they
explored the contents of the flash drives because they were curious. They
also opened files that should have corresponded to images or exam solutions
for the current semester, neither of which typically locate the owner. (How-
ever, we do concede that exams at the University of Illinois often specify the
professor’s name on a cover sheet for the exam; while we do not believe it is
likely, it is possible that students may be using the current exam to attempt
to return the drive to its proper owner. This idea is supported by the fact
that files corresponding to the exam were opened, rather than solutions.)
Interestingly, it appears that some of this curiosity was actually caused by
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suspicion about the experiment.
Our evidence appears to suggest that these two sources appear to be the
primary drivers of the effectiveness of this experiment.
Finally, we discuss the conclusions with regards to our hypotheses:
• Hypothesis 1: Participants will place the flash drives in computers and
click on the relevant files. Supported by our data.
• Hypothesis 2a: Participants who pick up flash drives will primarily
report doing so for two reasons: to return the flash drive to its owner
(an altruistic reason) and out of curiosity/to benefit from the contents
of the drive (a self-interested reason). Supported in a weak sense
by our data; altruism and curiosity (although not explicit self-interest)
appear to motivate participants, although we do not know the role of
other potential motivators that we did not test for.
• Hypothesis 2b: Psychological scales that measure risk attitude will cor-
relate with cybercrime victimization in the general population because
participants who believe that picking up the flash drive is too risky will
not do so and will thus not be victimized. Unknown because we did
not have time to run the experiment.
• Hypothesis 2c: Participants who picked up the flash drives will have
greater risk attitude scores than the general population. Not sup-
ported by the data; in comparison with the population given in one
of Blais and Weber’s papers [9], participants who picked up the flash
drives displayed significantly less willingness to participate in risky ac-
tivities in all domains except the recreational domain.
• Hypothesis 3a: The time of day at which drives are placed will not
significantly impact success rates because people will quickly pick up
the drives once they are dropped. Supported by the data.
• Hypothesis 3b: The type of location at which drives are dropped will
significantly impact success rates because different location types will
attract different demographics and will have different drive visibilities.
Suggested by the data, although we do not have a large enough num-
ber of samples to conclude comfortably and we do not know partici-
pants’ demographics on a per-location basis.
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• Hypothesis 3c: Altruistically configured drives will have a greater suc-
cess rate than drives designed to motivate self-interest because par-
ticipants will be more motivated to plug in the drive if they believe
they can help someone by doing so. Not supported by the data; in
fact, return label drives performed significantly worse. However, many
participants expressed altruistic motivations in the survey.
• Hypothesis 3d: Both altruistically configured and self-interest-configured
drives will have greater success rates than the control group. Not sup-
ported by the data; unlabeled drives performed similarly to all other
groups (except return label drives).
5.2 Methodological Limitations
We include this section by describing limitations of the current study in
order to properly contextualize its contributions. The following limitations
are described from most serious to least serious, according to our judgment.
Only a few drives were dropped in each location. While our results
suggest that location could be a predictor of compromise, only 10 drives were
dropped in each location; this number is small enough to limit the conclusions
that we can draw from location data. We believe that this limitation is
inherent to this type of study, as a larger number of drives in any given
location may have aroused further suspicion.
Participants were aware of the experiment by mid-day Tuesday.
Due to posts to the Facebook Lost and Found group as well as Reddit, word
of the flash drives was publicized to an audience measuring in the thousands.
We believe that our quick placement of the drives (over a two-day period)
may have increased suspicion; however, by the time that the Reddit post
went up, we had dropped 3
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of the drives and were in the process dropping
the rest. We believe that this limitation is inherent to this type of study, as
we needed to drop a significant number of drives in order to collect enough
samples to perform statistical tests.
Some drives were dropped on different days. Drives dropped in
CRCE Lobby and Inside CRCE tended to accumulate over time; the small
size of this space necessitated that we drop some of these drives on a later
83
day. Due to a mix-up involving automated directions in the Android app,
drives placed in Lot B21 and Lot D22 were temporarily swapped; researchers
retrieved the drives and placed them the next day. One drive was accidentally
marked as dropped in Law Building Lecture Hall, although the drive was
not dropped. It was properly dropped the next day. BIF Lecture Hall was
generally locked during drop times, so drops were put off until the room was
unlocked again. In each case, drives were dropped during the same time
period in which they were scheduled.
As such, we believe that these late drops only affect data analysis involving
the evolution of the experiment over the course of days; we excluded these
locations from the appropriate analyses as a result.
5.3 Future Work
In this section, we discuss ideas and questions that could be explored more
thoroughly in future work.
Do participants behave differently after the study? Other work
[48] suggests that users behave differently after they have been subjected to
a “security incident.” It would be interesting to monitor individual users for
a period of time after the experiment to see if their security posture changes
significantly. If we promote awareness of the attack or administer the study
again, will users recognize the attack and warn others, or will they fall victim
again?
How does word of the attack spread organically? While we were
able to detect a few alert posts related to the experiment, we suspect that we
were unable to measure a significant amount of discussion regarding the flash
drives. It would be interesting to measure the propagation of information
about the experiment as it occurred.
Can this attack be coordinated? The framework that we built for
this experiment allows us to program many flash drives in a relatively short
amount of time; it took the research team approximately 12 hours to program
and precisely categorize 300 drives, for a time of approximately 2.4 minutes
per drive. Given the relatively scalable nature of our software (and the
relative lack of bookkeeping necessary for a real attack), we believe it would
be possible to half this programming time. At a rate of 500 drives per day,
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a motivated attacker could program 7000 drives in two weeks’ time. As our
app can be run on common Android smartphones and as the drives are the
only other physical component of the attack, we believe it would be possible
for an attacker to distribute the attack across multiple locations by shipping
pre-programmed drives to other agents in other locations and coordinating
the app via the central server.
5.4 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to provide insight into the classic security
anecdote: will a handful of dropped flash drives in the parking lot of a
company effectively compromise it?
Our study, in which we dropped 297 flash drives around campus of the
University of Illinois, suggests yes. By measuring many different dropped
drive parameters, we were able to provide some introductory insight into
the effectiveness of different drive combinations. By monitoring lag times
between drop and pickup and drop and file open, we were able to confirm
the rapidity of the experiment. By picking up returned drives, we were able
to quantify the return of drives through various channels and provide more
information supporting our altruism hypothesis. By analyzing user agent
strings of browsers who accessed our servers, we were able to gain insight
into victims’ systems. By monitoring social media and e-mails to our fake
accounts, we were able to confirm the community’s mass response and interest
in returning the drives to their proper owners. Finally, by asking users about
their experiences with the experiment, we were able to gain valuable insight
into their thought process.
We were able to learn that the attack is generally effective and that par-
ticipants appeared to be primarily interested in returning the drives to their
original owners, although they also displayed some curiosity.
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APPENDIX A
SURVEY INSTRUMENT
Tables A.1 and A.2 contain the instrument that was offered to participants
who picked up a flash drive and placed it into their computers.
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Table A.1: The survey given to respondents who picked up USB flash
drives (part 1).
SeBIS: [Never (1), Rarely (2), Sometimes (3), Often (4), Always (5), Prefer not to answer]
1. I set my computer screen to automatically lock if I don‘t use it for a prolonged period of
time.
2. I use a password/passcode to unlock my laptop or tablet.
3. I manually lock my computer screen when I step away from it.
4. I use a PIN or passcode to unlock my mobile phone.
5. I do not change my passwords, unless I have to.
6. Please choose often for this item to show you are paying attention.
7. I use different passwords for different accounts that I have.
8. When I create a new online account, I try to use a password that goes beyond the site‘s
minimum requirements.
9. I do not include special characters in my password if it‘s not required.
10. When someone sends me a link, I open it without first verifying where it goes.
11. I know what website I‘m visiting based on its look and feel, rather than by looking at the
URL bar.
12. I submit information to websites without first verifying that it will be sent securely (e.g.,
SSL, https://, a lock icon).
13. When browsing websites, I mouseover links to see where they go, before clicking them.
14. If I discover a security problem, I continue what I was doing because I assume someone
else will fix it.
15. When I‘m prompted about a software update, I install it right away.
16. I try to make sure that the programs I use are up-to-date.
17. Select always as the answer to this question.
18. I verify that my anti-virus software has been regularly updating itself.
DOSPERT (2006): For each of the following statements, please indicate the likelihood that
you would engage in the described activity or behavior if you were to find yourself in that
situation. Provide a rating from Extremely Unlikely to Extremely Likely, using the following
scale: [Extremely Unlikely (1), Moderately Unlikely (2), Somewhat Unlikely (3), Not Sure (4),
Somewhat Likely (5), Moderately Likely (6), Extremely Likely (7), Prefer not to answer]
1. Admitting that your tastes are different from those of a friend.
2. Going camping in the wilderness.
3. Betting a day‘s income at the horse races.
4. Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth diversified fund.
5. Select the third bubble from the left for this item.
6. Drinking heavily at a social function.
7. Taking some questionable deductions on your income tax return.
8. Disagreeing with an authority figure on a major issue.
9. Betting a day‘s income at a high-stake poker game.
10. Having an affair with a married man/woman.
11. If 2+2 = 5, please choose extremely likely. Otherwise, choose extremely unlikely.
12. Passing off somebody else‘s work as your own.
13. Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability.
14. Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock.
15. Going whitewater rafting at high water in the spring.
16. Betting a day‘s income on the outcome of a sporting event.
17. Engaging in unprotected sex.
18. Revealing a friend‘s secret to someone else.
19. Driving a car without wearing a seat belt.
20. Investing 10% of your annual income in a new business venture.
21. Taking a skydiving class.
22. Purchasing a banana for $1000. Choose extremely unlikely if you wouldn‘t.
23. Riding a motorcycle without a helmet.
24. Choosing a career that you truly enjoy over a more secure one.
25. Speaking your mind about an unpopular issue in a meeting at work.
26. Select not sure as the answer to this question.
27. Sunbathing without sunscreen.
28. Bungee jumping off a tall bridge.
29. Piloting a small plane.
30. Walking home alone at night in an unsafe area of town.
31. Moving to a city far away from your extended family.
32. Starting a new career in your mid-thirties.
33. Leaving your young children alone at home while running an errand.
34. Not returning a wallet you found that contains $200.
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Table A.2: The survey given to respondents who picked up USB flash
drives (part 2).
Demographics:
1. Are you male or female? [Female, Male, Prefer not to answer]
2. What is your age? [17 or younger, 18-20, 21-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60 or older, Prefer not
to answer]
3. What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have
received? [Less than high school degree, High school degree or equivalent (e.g., GED), Some
college but no degree, Associate degree, Bachelor degree, Graduate degree, Prefer not to answer]
4. Which of the following categories best describes your employment status? [Employed, work-
ing full-time; Employed, working part-time; Not employed, looking for work; Not employed,
NOT looking for work; Retired; Disabled, not able to work; Prefer not to answer ]
Other questions:
1. On average, how much time did you spend on the Internet per week (e.g., searching for
information, checking email, streaming videos)? [Less than 10 hours, More than 10 but less
than 30 hours, More than 30 but less than 50 hours, More than 50 but less than 80 hours, More
than 80 hours, Prefer not to answer]
2. Select the task(s) that you have previously accomplished; if none of these tasks applies
to your situation, then please select “None of the above”: [I have installed or re-installed an
operating system on a computer, I have configured a home network, I have created a web page,
None of the above, Prefer not to answer]
USB Questions:
1. Why did you pick up the flash drive and insert it into your computer? [Open-ended]
2. Why did you open a file on the flash drive? [Open-ended]
3. Did you happen to notice any of the following things about the flash drive you picked up?
[It had a label attached to it, It had items (such as keys) attached to it, Other (please specify),
Prefer not to answer]
4. Did any labels attached to the flash drive significantly impact your decision to pick it up
and place it into your computer? [Yes, No, I did not notice any labels attached to the flash
drive, Prefer not to answer]
5. (If yes to 4) How did any labels attached to the flash drive influence you to pick it up and
insert it into your computer? [Open-ended]
6. Did any items (such as keys) attached to the flash drive significantly impact your decision
to pick it up and place it into your computer? [Yes, No, I did not notice any items attached to
the flash drive, Prefer not to answer]
7. (If yes to 6) How did items (such as keys) attached to the flash drive influence you to pick
it up and insert it into your computer? [Open-ended]
8. Did you have any concerns about picking up the flash drive and inserting it into your
computer? If so, please explain. [Open-ended]
9. Did you have any concerns about opening the file on the flash drive? [Open-ended]
10. Did you take any precautions before opening the file on the flash drive (e.g., scanning it
for viruses)? [Open-ended]
11. Had you heard any information about this research study in the past? [Yes, No, Prefer not
to answer]
12. Please select your affiliation with the University of Illinois, if any. [Faculty, Staff, Graduate
Student, Undergraduate Student, No affiliation, Prefer not to answer]
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